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ABSTRACT
This project set out  to analyse the relationship between the UK and 
the EU spurred by  Prime Minister David Cameron’s proposal  of, the 
possibility of, an in/out referendum. Using analytical  tools  from 
Laclau  & Mouffe’s Discourse Theory  this  project analyses political 
articulations and how these construct and follow discursive logics 
that constrain and enable political  action. This is done through a 
historical  analysis, discerning the logics of different political 
articulations that are then  used to perform  a contemporary analysis 
of Conservative, Labour, Liberal  Democrats  and Ukip. It seeks to 
identify  how historically  constructed logics manifest themselves in 
the present debate. The analysis  argues that historically  constructed 
logics are prevailing in  the whole spectrum of British  politics and 
that these logics constrain  the different political  actors, especially 
the Conservative and Labour that engage in  an attempt to re-
articulate and converge discursive logics that have historically been 
constructed as oppositions.
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INTRODUCTION
Our  aim  in  this project is to investigate the British  debate on Europe and 
membership of the European  Union  in  the relation  between  the present debate on  an 
in/out referendum  and historical conceptions of the European Union. We present  an 
argument that  underlines the importance of domestic  political  identities when 
examining possible political outcomes of European membership. 
David Cameron’s speech  in January  2013  in  which  he discusses Britain’s relationship 
with  the EU,  the need for  renegotiation  and not  least  the possibility  of an  in/out 
referendum  in  the UK serves as a  critical  juncture in  modern British  debate on 
European  membership. Since the EEC  referendum  in  1975  this possibility  is the first 
in  which  the British  people have been  (somewhat) promised a direct say  on  their EU 
membership, which  is according  to national polls holding  an  increasing  level of 
mistrust  within  the UK (Boffey  & Helm,  2012). Noting  the importance of European 
cooperation in  the European  project,  Cameron  underlined his commitment to 
economic  and political integration  into the EU,  whilst  maintaining  a  Conservative 
key  issue, by  acknowledging  the need for  European reform  in  order  to meet national 
interests inherently  outside collective interests of the European Union  (The Times 
2013).
In  a  situation  of European  debate focused on a stagnating  regional economy  caused 
by  the Eurozone crisis, alongside possible enlargements to a  wider  Europe with 
countries in  the Balkans and the close Middle East  moving towards membership, the 
British  political debate,  epitomised by  Cameron’s speech,  diverts attention  towards 
much  broader  political questions of ‘how  much’ integration  and the limits of 
European  unity.  This triggers not  only  Conservative  debate of EU membership,  but 
also introduces the need of other  political  parties to take a  stance on  the issue and 
invokes the need for legitimising discourses on all sides of the political spectrum.
PROBLEM AREA
THEORISING ON EU AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES
Theorising  on  European  Integration  has been  subjected greatly  to scholarly  interest 
as well as intense political debate.  One of the most influential  neo-functionalist 
scholars, Ernst Haas, defined integration as the process
“whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities to a new centre, whose institutions  process or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 16)
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This definition  is often  described as broad in  the sense that  it  includes both  a  social 
and political process differing  from  the more ‘realist’ notions focusing  on  state actors 
only  (Schimmelfennig,  2004: 76). Haas explains this shift  in  loyalties or  spill-over 
from economic integration as a product of calculated self-interests of different elites:
“The  ‘good Europeans’ are  not the main creators of the  regional 
community that is growing up; the  process of community 
formation is dominated by nationally constituted groups with 
specific interests and aims, willing and able  to adjust their 
aspirations by turning to supranational means when this  course 
appears profitable” (Ernst Haas in Risse, 2004: 3)
Here Haas,  displays his position between  ‘soft’ rationalism  (considering values and 
ideas; Risse,  2008: 3),  and a  more strictly  rationalist  approach  understanding  actor 
preferences and interests with  a  strong  focus on  material  ‘realities’ (Hay  & 
Rosamond, 2002: 3). As Sean Carey  (2002: 389) states, investigations of “public 
attitudes  towards  the European Union have been dominated by  economic  and 
rational cost-benefit explanations”.  Other studies, such  as Carey’s own  and the 
works of Liesbet  Hooghe & Gary  Marks, have sought  to shift  the focus from  cost-
benefit  explanations towards a focus on how  national identity  can  be a constraining 
factor  for  politicians with  regards to European  Integration  (Carey, 2002).  As Haas, 
they  argue that  integration is indeed triggered by  a  mismatch  between efficiency  and 
domestic structures of authority  but  develop it  further,  by  arguing  that  functional 
pressures can not  account for  regime outcomes alone and that investigations thus 
also have to account for  the mechanisms and dynamics of identity  between  national 
politics and the European  level  (Hooghe & Marks, 2008: 2).  They  analyse such 
dynamics, through  accounts of the public  opinion  as measured in  Eurobarometer 
statistics (ibid).  Such  attempts relate closely  to Haas’ ideas of shifting  loyalties trying 
to question  their  automaticity  and as Risse argues actually  take up some of Haas’ 
early  thoughts of multiple identities (Risse,  2004: 4); thus seeking  to meet  the 
criticism  towards neo-functionalism  that  it  does not hold a  potential  for 
disintegration (Schmitter, 2004: 47).
These works seek to break with  the idea  of identification with  political institutions as 
a  zero-sum  game,  wherein the loyalty  to one excludes the loyalty  to another. Risse, 
arguing  the same point,  shows that the majority  of European  citizens identify  with 
both  city,  state and Europe at  the same time (Risse 2008: 295).  As Risse (ibid.) 
points out,  this idea  of multiple identities is often  conceived of as nested and placed 
neatly  in  concentric  circles, further  arguing  that this is a  too simplistic way  of 
conceiving  the issue; identities are not  necessarily  separated in  a fashion excluding 
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their  mutual influence on  each other,  and as distinct identities which  actors can pick 
and choose from.
Arguing  further, we would assert  that conceiving  these identities as nested would 
imply  conceiving  the European identity  as one single regional identity  with  clear 
borders and an inner  core that  embody  all of the national identities.  Rather, we 
would argue, following  Risse (ibid.),  for a  more complex  vision of multiple identities, 
where each  identity  is not  neatly  separated but  intertwined with  its peers and highly 
affected by  changes in  either  one of the other  identities. As such,  European  identities 
are not  separated from  national  identity,  but rather,  are highly  contingent;  “the EU 
become enmeshed with given national identities  leading to  rather diverging 
identity outcomes” (ibid.: 296).
Following  Hooghe & Marks,  we argue that  national political identities become of 
increasing  importance as the domestic costs for  political leaders’ decisions on EU are 
rising.  Hooghe & Marks (2008: 5).  argue that the relation  between  politicians and 
public opinions have shifted from  permissive consensus to becoming  characterised 
rather  by  constraining dissensus, Leaders now  have to “look  over their shoulders 
when negotiating European issues.  What they see does  not reassure them”  (Ibid). 
Following  this point of view, it  can  also be argued that  the stances by  political elites 
will,  at  least to a  higher  extent,  have to take into account  the opinions of the citizenry 
as the domestic costs of EU politics have increased, as also the use of referenda have 
increased together  with  media  attention,  resulting  in  an  increase in  exposure of EU 
politics to the public.  As Hooghe & Marks (2008: 23) also point  out,  such  statistical 
analyses have several  lacunae, one of them  being  “an incomplete  account of the 
construction of identity”. 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES
Opposed to the statistical analyses that Hooghe & Marks, Carey  and others pursue, 
we propose a  social constructivist  investigation,  founded in  discourse theory, 
focusing on  how  political identities are constructed through  discursive articulations 
of ‘Others’ in  binary  oppositions,  particular  historical interpretations, logical and 
symbolic arguments and followingly  how  such articulations constrain  and enable 
possible political action. As such  we follow  Rosamond & Wincott’s (2006: 2) 
argument about  the debate surrounding the Constitutional Treaty  in  2005, where 
French  and British  articulations of what EU was and should be,  illuminated two 
radically  contrasting  images, highlighting  the “significance of discourse and of the 
constitutive effects of discursive practices”. 
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They  convincingly  show  how  the French and British  articulations of EU had more to 
do with  domestic  preferences and structures of discourse than with  so-called 
‘objective’ economic rationales; the mainstream  French discourse constructed the 
Constitutional Treaty  as a neo-liberal,  anglo-saxon  attempt  to destroy  their  unique 
social model whilst  British  public  and political debate portrayed the Constitutional 
Treaty  as an  interventionist  social  model that  would seriously  limit  their  “liberal 
flexibility” (Ibid.). Vivian Schmidt  argues on  the same lines,  concerning  the lack of a 
legitimising discourse in the UK: 
“So, why does Britain complain so much about the  impact of the 
EU on national policies and practices? For this, it is  necessary to 
consider how the EU challenges national ideas about democracy 
and how national leaders have  responded to  such challenges  in 
their discourse to the general public” (Schmidt, 2006: 26). 
THE EUROZONE CRISIS - A CRUCIAL CASE
Europe right  now  experiences a  rather  turbulent period with  the Eurozone Crisis 
pervading  almost all  member  states in  different  forms.  European  countries are now, 
especially  the southern  European, increasingly  struggling to fulfil  the convergence 
criteria  for  being  part of the Eurozone and the economic strategies for  dealing  with 
these issues are reasons for  intense debate and political polarisations. The ‘divide’, 
between  the approaches of Germany  and France, structure much  of the debate and 
the following  hegemonic struggles for  defining  e.g.  the economic policy  agenda.  This, 
as much  as it  triggers debate and articulations of economic rationales,  it  also seems 
to trigger more general  discussions of the European Union in  national politics. The 
Dutch election  of 2012  is the prime example of how  European politics have entered 
domestic political  affairs on  a  new  scale,  able to be decisive issues for  electoral 
support.  Such articulations, as were made in  the Netherlands, of the domestic 
relationship to EU are of crucial importance as they  make possible, shape,  structure 
and limit  political  action (Rosamond & Hay, 2002: 9).  As such,  these articulations 
are part  of the construction and sedimentation  of different  identities and logics of 
discourse, in relating to historical structures and patterns of such. 
At the moment we see the formation  of two, more or  less different,  approaches to 
what  the EU’s economic policies should be, identified as either the German  or  French 
model. However  extensive the debate between  the future of a  German,  French or 
Western European Europe is,  when  it comes to the question  of the British  debate on 
the EU the picture changes. The future  of the EU might  be debated heavily  within 
Germany  and France - and between the countries,  but  there is not, as in  the UK, 
much  debate or serious questioning of whether  or  not to continue within  the 
European  project.  In  the UK,  the debate seems also to address much  broader  issues 
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of the UK’s relationship to Britain  and it  thus might illustrate a crucial  case suitable 
for analysis (Tassinari, 2013). 
Often  portrayed as “the EU’s  awkward partner”,  a  central question pertains to the 
nature of British  membership within  the EU,  and how  this construction  manifests 
itself in  different conceptions of the EU,  than that of the Western  European 
countries, and in  such a  way  that it  is even  possible to imagine an EU without the 
UK. As Rosamond & Wincott  (2006: 2) point  out,  the discussion  about the 
Constitutional Treaty  “was  perhaps the first time when a struggle over the 
‘imaginary’ of the EU was exposed to the  rigours of public discourse”.  We find the 
current situation  to be somewhat  similar,  as British  politics as well as the national 
politics of many  European  countries are increasingly  articulating  imaginaries of the 
EU.  In the British  case such  debates involves fundamental  questions; as Chris Patten, 
European  Commissioner  for  External Relations,  in  2004  asked at  a  lecture at  the 
University of Cambridge: 
“Will Britain ever ‘actually’ join the  EU? … The question what 
should be  our relationship with Europe? folds  into the  question 
about what sort of people  do we  think we are? Answering the 
question about Europe  answers  the  question about us”  (Patten, 
2004).
Cameron’s recent  speech  about  a  possible in/out  referendum, following a 
Conservative victory  in  the 2015  general election,  have spurred different  political 
actors of the UK to articulate national  interests and the particularities of such. It  is 
also discussed whether  the proposal made in  Cameron’s speech does actually  bring 
something  new  to the relationship or  whether  these discussions follow  traditional 
internal party  competition  (John  Worth in  Tassinari,  2013).  Whatever  the reasons 
for  the debate it  does seem  to take the shape of what  one might  call a  significant  or 
even  crucial event in  the relationship between Britain and the EU and as such  the 
British  political  articulations of this process might  reveal  interesting  insights.  The 
proposal of a  possible referendum  and the increase in  both  academic and public 
interest on  the matter  thus makes up an  interesting  case for  investigating  the logics 
of the British  discursive construction  of the EU and discuss some of the 
consequences of such. With this in mind, we ask the following question: 
“How is the  relationship between the  UK and EU articulated 
historically by the main political parties of the  UK and what are 
the  implications of such articulations for the  present debate  on the 
possibility of an in/out referendum?”
We pursue our analysis by  making  use of the following research  questions to guide 
our answer of the problem formulation above: 
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• How  are national  political identities constructed through articulations by  leading 
political actors?
• What  insights does a Social Constructivist approach  to understanding political 
identities offer that are not accounted for in other epistemological frameworks?
• How  has the conception of Europe, as articulated by  leading  British  political actors, 
historically  created patterns and logics that enable and constrain the contemporary 
debate on the EU? 
• How  are EU-UK relations described and thus constructed through  political 
speeches and parliamentary debates in the period between 1950 and today?
• How  does the current debate on  an  in/out  referendum  follow  the historically 
established logics?
• What  are the political  perspectives of these developments and how  does this 
structure possible political outcomes?
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AIM AND SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT
As outlined, the aim  of this project is to critically  investigate the discursive structures 
that  constrain and enable the current  debate on  EU membership with  the United 
Kingdom. To do so we apply  theoretical and methodological  tools,  that  pertain  to 
questions of political  identities.  We start  out  by  outlining  different  current theoretical 
uses of the concept  of identity  in European  Integration  theory.  This is then  debated 
from  a  post-structuralist  framework of Discourse Theory,  where we argue for  an 
expansion  of the identity  concept  in  order  to account  for  the discursive construction, 
that structure possible political actions.
We apply  the established theoretical and analytical tools in  a  two-step analysis.  First, 
we establish  a  historical account  of the construction  of different  conceptions of 
British  political identities,  and their  historical trajectories amounting  to different 
conception  of EU membership and -participation. Secondly,  we apply  the established 
logics and structures in  a  second analytical exercise that  map out  the current  political 
debate, by  examining how  it  is structured by  constructed discursive systems. This 
enables us to discuss the state of art  of the current debate, pinpoint  theoretical issues 
on  current  Integration  Theory,  as well  as establishing  possible political trajectories 
based on the findings in our analysis.
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APPROACHING THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES
IDENTITY CONCEPTIONS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY
European  Integration  theory  is, like many  others, a  contested field of studies and 
before embarking  on any  analysis it  is important to take a  stance and enable both 
one-self as well as the reader to build unto existing  research  and knowledge. Luckily, 
research  on  European Integration  and European  development in general has been 
subjected to an immense amount of academic interest  and together  forms what 
Wiener  & Diez (2004: 7)  talks of as “the mosaic of integration theory”. This mosaic 
forms a  pallet  of theories that  together  gives a  very  elaborate picture of the 
immensely  complex  issue of European  Integration. At this point  however, we are 
already  starting to take decisions on  the role of theory,  what it  is, what  it should be 
and what  it  can be. In  this short  section  we will therefore try  to shortly  outline some 
of the main  strands of European Integration  theory,  how  the different  approaches 
relate to each  other  and most importantly  how  we position  ourselves in  the conduct 
of our analysis.
THREE PHASES OF INTEGRATION THEORY
To Bache et al.  one of the reasons for  the emergence of a  particular  academic field 
devoted to European Integration  was due to the challenge that the signing  of the 
Treaty  of Paris in  April  1951  posed to existing  theories of International  Relations 
(2011: 3). As they  say  “It was  something of a  surprise to academic theorists of IR 
when governments in western Europe began to surrender their national 
sovereignty in some policy areas”  (Ibid.).  Theories of international relations were at 
this point largely  dominated by  realist accounts in  which the nation state was 
considered the only  important  unit  of political life, as described in the works of Hans 
Morgenthau  and E.  H. Carr  - opposed to what  was perceived as ideological  political 
theories of e.g.  Woodrow  Wilson  and the failure of his aspirations with  the league of 
nations (Burchill  et al. 2005: 4). The theories that  arose thus also has to be 
considered in this context as well as the essential challenges it posed to realist theory.
Wiener  & Diez divides the development  of integration  theory  into three broad phases 
due to their  historical  disciplinary  context: one of explaining  integration,  another 
seeking  to analyse governance and the third focusing on “substantial questions  about 
‘constructing’ (and limiting) European Integration” (2004: 7-10).
Wiener  & Diez start out by  mentioning what  they  call “the precursor”  (2004: 7) of 
Integration  Theory, namely  the (explicitly)  normative theories of functionalism  and 
federalism. The works of David Mitrany  in the interwar  years was concerned with 
how  functional integration could constrain  the autonomous authority  of states and 
11
prevent future war.  The European Union  of Federalists and their  call  for a  federal 
constitution for  Europe together with  functionalism  provided the founding  ideas 
about  the construction  of what  is now  the EU (Bache et  al., 2011: 6). This, along with 
the heritage from  the realist  school  of International Relations theory  is what 
European  Integration theory  in  general builds upon - rational  actors and material 
interests.
Explaining European Integration
The first phase of theory  building revolved around contesting and defending  realist 
assumptions through  explanations of the processes of institution building  above the 
state level.  Although  the two divides between  the realist  accounts and strands of the 
functionalist  accounts disagreed sharply, both  however  agreed that  actors are 
rational, and the disagreement  was thus on  locating  the drivers of integration  with 
different actors - governments or  interest  groups - and thus explaining  the 
phenomenon (Wiener & Diez, 2004: 8).
The neo-functionalist  explanations focus on  particular  societal  and market  patterns 
that  erupted as a consequence of functional  integration  and thus determined the 
direction in the move away  from  an  anarchic  state system  to supranational 
institution-building  (Wiener  & Diez,  2004: 8).  The theory  focuses here much on  how 
non-state actors, that form at the regional level,
“seek to exploit the  inevitable  spillovers and unintended 
consequences that occur when states agree  to  assign some  degree 
of supra-national responsibility for accomplishing a limited task 
and then discover that satisfying that function has external effects 
upon other of their interdependent activities”  (Schmitter in Wiener 
& Diez, 2004: 46).
 This is crucial as it  is what generates some of the spill-overs and also assigns the 
much  criticised automaticity  into the theory, not leaving  much room  for  dis-
integration (Ibid.: 47).  Leon  Lindberg’s (1963: 123) much  used definition of spill-over 
sees it  as “a situation in which a given action, related to  a specific  goal, creates  a 
situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, 
which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth”. 
Such spill-over  effects are usually  thought  of in  three terms: functional,  political and 
cultivated  (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). Functional spill-overs relate to how  modern 
economies are highly  interconnected and as such  the functional  integration of one 
sector  will  inevitably  affect  other  sectors.  Political spill-over  follows the same logic 
with  focus on  the rise in political pressures in  favour  of further  integration.  Interest 
groups in  one sector  will have to exert  pressure at  the supranational  level if their 
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sector  is integrated thus realising  the benefits from  integration as well  as the barriers 
for  reaping all those benefits. According  to neo-functionalist theory  the groups will 
realise that the main  barrier is non-integrated sectors,  leading to national lobbying 
for  further  integration  which  in turn  creates a  barrier  for  disintegration (Bache et  al. 
2011: 10).  Cultivated spill-over  focuses on  the role  of institutions in  “cultivating 
contacts behind the scenes” (Ibid.)  where ”accommodation can be  facilitated by an 
autonomous  and institutionalised mediator [resulting  in  an]  'upgrading of the 
common interest’”  (Tranholm-Mikkelsen,  1991). The theory  suffered a  hard hit  with 
the ‘empty  chair’ crisis of 1965-66  during which  de Gaulle imposed a  boycott  of all 
Council of Ministers meetings for 6  months until the Luxembourg Compromise was 
reached, representing  a considerable blow  to the process of European integration 
and re-introduced the power  of national governments in  practice as well  as 
theorizing (Bache et al. 2011: 128-30).
Such (neo-)realist  accounts especially  Stanley  Hoffman and Andrew  Moravcsik, 
labelled intergovernmentalism  or liberal governmentalism, focuses on  the state as 
the prime driver  of European  Integration (Schimmelfennig  in  Wiener  & Diez,  2004: 
76).  Intergovernmentalism  as proposed by  Hoffmann  started out as a  prime criticism 
of neo-functionalist accounts and was essentially  made up of three parts (Haas in 
Bache et al, 2011: 11):
• European  Integration  had to be seen  in  a  global context  in  which 
regional  integration was only  one aspect  of the development  of the global 
international system; international relations conditions regional 
integration and can  not,  as neo-functionalist accounts propose, be 
understood as fixed.
• National governments were ultimately  the unique actor’s controlling 
the integration process due to calculations of national interests.
• Integration  would not  spread to areas of ‘high  politics’,  such  as national 
security  issues, and hence showed that  the neo-functionalist argument 
was based on  what he called a ‘false  arithmetic’ assuming  that the powers 
of every  elite group was ultimately  equal and that  a  great number  of non-
state elite groups could outnumber the government.
Although  acknowledging  that  interest  groups could play  some role in  areas of ‘low-
politics’ he considered the governments of state and its material  interests as the 
prime unit of analysis because of two reasons. One, the governments possesses legal 
sovereignty  and followingly  because they  had the highest  level of political legitimacy 
in the integration process (Ibid: 12).
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Liberal Intergovernmentalism  as developed primarily  by  Moravcsik  builds unto 
Hoffmann’s work  but  introduces nuanced or  more neo-realist  conception  of the 
state; departing from  conceiving of states as unitary  entities or black boxes and 
instead proposed the concept  of two-level games. The domestic level determines 
national interests through  political  processes and thus determines what the 
governments bring  with  them  into the international level.  On the international level, 
however, conflicting national interests are reconciled and the outcomes ultimately 
reflect  the relative bargaining  power of the  states and ‘objective’ economic benefits 
rather  than “political biases of politicians  or national strategic  security 
concerns”  (Ibid: 13). The focus is here on  the specific  policy  outcomes of major 
treaties; in  some contrast  to neo-functional  theory  oriented towards day-to-day 
policy  making.  Moravcsik’s analyses have been  criticised on  this account,  for  his use 
of case studies ultimately  determining  the outcome,  examining only  decisions 
requiring unanimous agreements with focus on economic issues (Scharpf, 1999: 165).
Analysing Governance
The second phase was characterised by  a shift to comparative politics as a 
recognition  of the complex institutional  setup of the European  Union.  This shift also 
brought  with  it a  stronger  emphasis on  interdisciplinary  analyses seeking  to “explore 
the nature of the beast”  through  attempts at  conceptualising the polity  as multilevel, 
network governance, multiperspectival  and so on  (Wiener  & Diez,  2004: 9). Angela 
Bourne points to this development  where many  subfields entered the study  of 
European  Integration  such  as democracy  studies,  foreign policy,  migration, 
territorial politics etc. all  contributing  to the development  of the dense web or  mosaic 
of European Integration theory  (Bourne 2012: 2). One of the important changes in 
this phase was the introduction  of the Multi-level-governance framework  which 
sought  to address some of the basic disagreements between the various ‘isms that, as 
Hay  & Rosamond argues, by  generally  relying  on economic rationales as explanation 
power, often  ending  up in  an  “inevitable profusion of literature trading claim  and 
counter-claim”  (Hay  & Rosamond,  2002: 3). Instead multi-level-governance sought 
to understand the ways in which
“a multiplicity of different politically independent but otherwise 
interdependent actors - private and public - at different levels of 
territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous negotiation/
deliberation/implementation, and that does not assign exclusive 
policy compétence  or assert a stable  hierarchy of political 
authority to any of these levels” (Schmitter, 2004: 49).
This approach  did become and is still  very  prominent in  EU studies and as Schmitter 
says “even its  own politicians  use it”  (Ibid.  49) thus exhibiting  the co-constitutive 
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relationship between  the production of academic knowledge and the reality  ‘out 
there’ or  what Rosamond discusses as push/external and pull/internal dynamics in 
which  the EU is pushed by  the academic discipline which  in  turn is pulled by  factors 
from the EU (Rosamond, 2007: 21).
Constructing European Integration
The third phase follows the above development of the dynamics between  the EU and 
national affairs with  still more focus on  the construction  of these.  This involves new 
normative theories,  as presented by  Critical  Theorists and Feminist  scholars (See e.g. 
Kröger  & Friedrich,  2013; Marchand, 2006; Bache et  al,  2011: 53),  post-structuralist 
accounts seeking  to problematise core concepts (e.g.  Howarth  & Torfing,  2005; 
Bartelson,  1995; Haahr & Walters, 2004) and, not  least,  theories trying to 
understand the “goal or finality of European Integration”  (Wiener  & Diez,  2004: 
10).
Trying to understand the outcome or  goal  of European Integration implies 
investigating  different  offers as to how  such  future should look  like and hence points 
to the politicisation  of different  issues.  As Ole Wæver  points out  such  approaches 
have involved themselves with  investigating e.g. the compatibility  of national 
discourses on  the European Union  and how  such  shape especially  foreign  policy 
options (Wæver, 2004: 206) or  what  Risse deems the goodness  of fit research 
agenda concentrating  on  two issues of either  “policy misfit or  institutional mis-
fit”  (Risse in  Jørgensen  et al.,  2007: 490). The studies of Ben  Rosamond have also 
dealt with  such issues focusing  on  the discursive constructions of national  economic 
interests (Rosamond & Hay, 2002; Rosamond & Wincott, 2006).  Following  also a 
much  broader  turn to identity-related questions in  the social sciences a  variety  of 
research  on  European Integration  have also involved itself with  the study  of identity 
and identities,  the constructions of such  and the interrelationship between  them 
(Brubaker & Cooper: 2000).
In  this project  we seek to follow  an  approach  in the intersection between the second 
and third phase  of Integration  theory.  We do this by  mixing the findings by  the 
Multi-Level-Governance approach with a  post-structuralist  approach  that  helps us 
identify  some of the different constraints and enablements that shape and structure 
the way  in  which  the different  governance systems interact  and function  co-
constitutively.  Taking  with  us this understanding,  we pursue to approach  this project 
in  a  manner  that does not  seek  to disprove or  go in  direct  opposition to other 
theories, but  rather  fill out gaps or  areas that other  approaches do not  seek  or  are 
unable to answer, and thus providing  pieces for  the future formation  of the Mosaic of 
European Integration Theory.
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THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY
This chapter  will  elaborate on  how  a  set  of authors conceptualise,  analyse and discuss 
identity-issues within European  Integration. After  their  respective argumentation  for 
the relevance of identity  within European  Integration Theory,  we will argue that  their 
use of identity  is confined within  static  and causal theoretical  frameworks,  that do 
not take into account  either  the changing and contingent nature of identities nor 
their  importance for  the politicisation and development of the European  Union.  In 
turn  they  fall short  on  explanations of the construction of identities as well  as more 
content-related questions of political identities.
A MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE
Prior to the 1980’s,  Liesbet  Hooghe & Gary  Marks argue, the importance of taking 
public opinion  seriously  was either  non-existent  or  at  best short lived (Hooghe & 
Marks,  2008: 9-10).  What  instead was prominent was a  point  of departure aimed at 
hypothesising objective consequences of “market integration for individual 
economic well-being,  using data on income, occupation” (ibid: 10).  What Hooghe & 
Marks believe to be incorrect  about  this form  of analysis is that  the respondents are 
most likely  unaware of specific  economic interests and thus not  in  a  position of 
perfect  knowledge - as assumed in  such  analyses (ibid: 10).  Hooghe & Marks here 
argue that individuals have to rely on cues;
“These  cues could be  be  ideological, deriving from an individual’s 
position on left/right distributional conflict, or they could come 
from the media, intermediary institutions such as trade  unions or 
churches, or from political parties.” (ibid: 10)
Such cues  engage interests of an  economic nature as well  as identity. Thus,  the 
intention is to analyse what importance both  national identity  and group identities 
have for the political climate; 
“[Individuals] identify with territorial communities  on vastly 
different scales, from the local to the  regional, to the  national and 
beyond.” (ibid: 12)
EXCLUSIVE OR INCLUSIVE POLITICAL IDENTITIES
Furthermore,  these group identities relate  to one another  and how  they  are mobilised 
in  the elite debate  (ibid: 12; Hooghe & Marks,  2004a: 415). To offer  explanations to 
the question  of how  public  opinion can  be altered by  matters pertaining  to identity, 
Hooghe & Marks (2008: 12) offer three generalisations:
“  - Identity has  greater weight in public opinion than for elites  or 
interest groups
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  - Identity does not speak for itself in relation to most political 
objects, but must be politically constructed
  - The  more  exclusively an individual identifies with an ingroup, 
the  less  that individual is  predisposed to support a jurisdiction 
encompassing outgroups”
Hooghe & Marks (ibid.)  argue that  such  construction  entails: “priming (making a 
consideration salient),  framing (connecting a particular consideration to a political 
object) and cueing (instilling a bias).” This form  of construction  is especially  viable 
when  looking  at generalisation  number  three, as it  is not unusual to see  a strong 
national feeling  in  an  individual still  positive towards European  integration; what 
creates the  predisposition towards excluding outgroups,  is how  the individual sees 
the national identity  of him  / her  as inclusive or  exclusive (ibid: 14-5; Hooghe & 
Marks; 2004a: 415-6). Followingly  they  argue, that  individuals with  exclusive 
national identities  are: “predisposed to  Euroscepticism  if they are cued to believe 
that love  of their country and its  institutions is  incompatible with European 
integration.” (Hooghe & Marks, 2008: 13) 
This predisposition  is attributed to the power  of framing,  here seen  as connecting 
the consideration,  love of country, to the political object  - the European  Union  (ibid). 
Hooghe & Marks argue that this is precisely  what populist right wing parties do - 
thus implying that  political parties can  choose to frame an  issue or  not.  Inclusive 
identities, on  the other hand, are “apparently not affected by either the  existence or 
strength of a populist right party” (ibid). This notion of identities as exclusive  or 
inclusive lead Hooghe & Marks to argue that  one can no longer  keep European 
politics separate from  domestic  politics as public opinion is engaged in  both 
simultaneously through identity (ibid).
THE IMPORTANCE OF ELITE ARTICULATIONS
But  what consequences does this emergence of identity and its relationship with 
public opinion  have for  the elite? Hooghe & Marks argue that  because of the increase 
in  European  parliamentary  power  and its roots in  a  more democratised control of the 
political, the way  in  which  elites obtain their  goals has changed, because the public 
has been brought  into the decision-making  process (Hooghe & Marks,  2007: 5-6).  In 
order  to achieve goals, the elite must therefore accommodate and/or  attempt  to 
shape public opinion through cues as this is vital in achieving success:
“The  era in which relatively insulated elites bargained grand 
treaties  in the shadow of an uninterested and generally approving 
public has come to an end” (ibid: 5)
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Hooghe & Marks (2008: Footnote p.  20)  argue that  this increase  in  democratisation, 
especially  through  referendums, is “[shifting] the initiative to the citizens and single 
groups  and disarm  party elites” prompting  an  immense increase of interest  in  public 
opinion  for  the political  spectrum  as referendums “are elite  initiated events  with 
elite-defying consequences” (ibid: 20).  In our investigation  we will,  however,  pursue 
to approach  the analysis without  understanding public opinion  as necessarily 
conflicting nor defying  to elite-interests but rather  seek  to understand how  elite-
articulations are constructed as part of complex and contingent discursive systems.
A ‘PRAGMATIC CONSTRUCTIVIST’ APPROACH
This chapter  will  present  Thomas Risse’s adaptation  of Ernst Haas’ view  on  identity. 
There will  be a  focus on  the claim  laid forth  by  Risse concerning the ‘handing over’ of 
sovereignty  to supranational  structures and the implications this has concerning 
national identity and foreign policy.
SHIFTING OF LOYALTIES
Thomas Risse takes his point  of departure in Ernst Haas’ “pragmatic 
constructivism” (Haas in  Risse,  2004: 1) arguing  that this may  accommodate certain 
critiques laid forth  by  rationalists and others (Risse,  2004: 1).  Risse borrows another 
tool from Haas when defining political integration;
“The  process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings  are  persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and 
political activities  toward a new centre, whose  institutions possess 
or demand jurisdiction over the  pre-existing national 
states” (Haas in Risse, 2004: 1)
The shifting  of loyalties,  Risse interprets as a  conceptualization  of collective identity; 
“a subject matter dear to social constructivists” (Risse, 2004: 1).  Haas,  according  to 
Risse,  utilizes an  understanding  from  Karl Deutsch  to point  out just  how  shifting 
loyalties is related to identity:
“The  kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration 
[...] turned out to be  rather a matter of mutual sympathy and 
loyalties; of ‘we-feeling’, trust, and mutual consideration; or 
p a r t i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n t e r m s o f s e l f - i m a g e s a n d 
interests”  (Deutsch in Risse, 2004: 2)
This should be seen  as a  conclusion  to, and not  a  starting  point, that collective 
identity  and its identification  with  structures or  institutions is a  way  of 
understanding integrational progress (Risse, 2004: 2).
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THE POSSIBILITY OF SEVERAL LOYALTIES
Risse points out that  the reason  for  it not  being  a  starting  point  is that  Haas did not 
assume collective identity,  and the formation of this, as constituent for  integration. 
This was instead dominated by:
“nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims, 
willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to 
supranational means when this course  appears profitable” (Haas 
in Risse, 2004: 2)
Within here lies an  assumption  that a  ‘rational’ actor  will  shift  his or her  focus when 
it  is deemed profitable, and through  this transfer  of authority,  to a  “new 
centre”  (Risse,  2004: 3) leads to further  identification  with  said centre; the shifting  of 
loyalty. This transfer  without  further elaboration  implies rejection  of what was before 
in  order to sustain loyalty  to a  new  centre, this is however  not  necessarily  the case; 
what  is instead introduced,  Risse argues,  is multiple loyalties (ibid). The implication 
of this is an  establishment of causality, between loyalty  and centre. Risse points out 
that  Haas established three causal mechanisms to define how, when  and why  actors 
might obtain new loyalties:
“(1) they value the new centre as an end in itself,
(2) the  new center of authority pressures them into conformity, or 
(3) as  a side-product of otherwise instrumental behavior toward 
another ultimate end” (Haas in Risse, 2004: 3) 
Risse argues that,  combined,  these three causal mechanisms sum  up the socialization 
process as the internalising  of “the values and norms  of the community” (Ibid.). 
While  it  was previously  established that Haas rejected the notion of identity  as a 
catalyst for integration,  Risse here points out  that later  neo-functionalist  theory  have 
argued against  precisely  this and argued that  there can  indeed exist  individuals to 
which  European  integration  is an  “end in itself” pertaining to matters of identity 
(Risse,  2004: 3-5).  The second mechanism  pertains to a  matter  of getting  used to a 
supranational structure that  in the end causes a shift of loyalty, Risse deems this to 
be habitualization and argues that  this,  along  with the first causal mechanism, is not 
a  matter  of “instrumental utility-maximizing” (ibid: 4).  The last  mechanism  is the 
combined effort  of the first  two, namely  an  accommodation  of interest  and thereby 
an  accommodation and assimilation of identity  (ibid).  Risse argues that while Haas 
initially  rejected this theory,  he was nonetheless right in the understanding of 
European  identity  as a  conceptual  contract able to be sliced up and split  between 
different centres of loyalty (ibid). 
Risse here draws upon  the ontologically  constructivist  works of Benedict  Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities theory  to argue that  one need not necessarily  reject loyalty  to 
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one centre,  for  example the national,  to adopt loyalty  to a  new  centre, for  example the 
regional or European:
“people can feel as part of both communities without having to 
choose some primary identification.” (Anderson in Risse, 2004: 4)   
What  should be  noted here is that  the process in  which  Risse through  Haas comes to 
this conclusion, namely  that new  loyalty  does not  necessarily  euthanize old loyalty, 
and how  Anderson builds up the concept  of imagined communities as part  of ones 
identity  and self,  are intrinsically  different. The end argument of both  however  share 
a  theme: A strong  national identity  does not,  by  definition,  reject a  “belonging to 
Europe” (Risse, 2004: 5). 
This pertains to the matter  of shared values, Risse argues,  as there is a  surplus of 
opinions stating  that  an acknowledgement  of country  first, does not  mean  a rejection 
of Europe.  Risse,  though  he does not share the concept of exclusive  identities  with 
Hooghe & Marks, does acknowledge that these  will be less likely  to adopt  this 
‘belonging to Europe’.
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NATIONAL IDENTITY AS MORE THAN A DEPENDENT VARIABLE
“[Political discourses] exist independently of, but nevertheless 
shape the argumentative  structure of inter- and intra-party 
politics and act as  limitations of the  ‘politically possible’ in terms of 
Britain’s engagement with European integration.”  (Rosamond & 
Wincott 2006: 4)
The use of the concept of identity  in  European Integration Theory, as outlined in the 
two theoretical conceptions above, is construed as somewhat  of a  dependent variable, 
in  an  analytical scheme pertaining  to the question  of to what  extent  states and 
nations will  be inclined towards increased integration.  National  identities - defined 
through  historical events and traditions - is in  the above accounts perceived as a  part 
of the investigation  undertaken  to answer  this question, where  other  variables may 
well  play  an  (equally) important  role,  such  as economic and political rationalisation. 
Consequently, what  Hooghe & Marks criticise neo-functionalists for, namely  a 
simplistic and reductionist  attempt  to prove public support  through  economic 
rationale,  is what  in  the end comes back  to haunt them; the concept  of identity  is 
reduced to the causal relationship and fails to be accounted for independently. 
What  we propose here is a  slightly  different  conception  of the use of identity  when 
examining  the relationship between  the UK and the EU. Through  adopting  the post-
structuralist  framework  of Discourse Theory, we propose to look  at  the question  of 
identity  as a much more holistic concept; focusing on the construction  of political 
identities as discourses. Rather  than  treating  the construction of national identities 
as dependent  variables with  complementary  effects on  policy  decisions, we argue that 
the construction of different  political identities and their  inherent logics as well as 
the hegemonic success and sedimentation  of these political discourses determine, 
shape and constrain possible political outcomes.  Rather  than  establishing  a  static 
conception  of a  specific national identity  as applied in  quantitative analyses - as 
something analytically  exogenous to political  actors - we examine actors’ 
articulations of different discourses. We examine how  these social realities  are 
contingently  established through  articulations and re-articulations of a  wide array  of 
elements,  including  both  economic,  political  and cultural issues. Thus, we do not 
exclude Risse’s discussions of national identities nor Hooghe & Marks’ conception  of 
identities, but  rather  we argue that a  widening of the concept of identity  as discursive 
systems in  European  Integration  is needed, in  order  to account for  the construction 
and content of the multitude of politically  established realities,  presented to us in 
British  discourse on the EU. Applying  this strategy,  we will  draw  on the Discourse 
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Theory  developed by  Ernesto Laclau  & Chantal Mouffe1,  and its adjacent 
epistemological and methodological tools developed for  analysing  discursive 
structures.
DISCOURSE THEORY AND POLITICAL IDENTITIES
This chapter will outline our  choice of the Essex  School of Discourse Theory  and how 
it  can  be used in relation  to the concepts of multiple identities and the construction 
of national identities in  regional integration, that  we draw  from  Hooghe & Marks and 
Risse.
As laid out,  Hooghe & Marks (2008: 12-5)  argue that  national decisions regarding 
the increase of regional integration, must  be seen  not just  from  a  perspective of 
economic  rationality, but  that factors of national identity  are increasingly  important. 
They  make an  example of ‘exclusive national identities’ as being  far more prone to 
euroscepticism  domestically,  with  the only  logical  explanation  being  constitutional 
tendencies and traditions, and that  these are rooted in  national  identity  (Hooghe & 
Marks,  2007: 6-7; Hooghe & Marks, 2008: 13-5). Risse makes a  similar  point: on 
deliberations and decisions to increase supranational integration  in  issues of foreign 
policies,  states with  traditions for  federalism,  such  as Germany,  the issue of handing 
over sovereignty  is a  part of the constitutional tradition within  that  country  (Risse 
2004: 11-6). For  countries with  no tradition of federalism  and with  strong unitary 
sovereign  institutions,  such  as the UK, are less inclined to participate in 
supranational integration,  through establishment  of majority  rule in EU policy  areas 
etc.
Wæver  (2005) makes an even  more compelling  point  in  relation  to the issue of 
national identity,  rather  than  it amounting to just  constitutional preference per se.  In 
France, the strengthening  of the power  of the EU is seen as a  natural development 
and as the continuity  of french  ‘universal’ values, which  are secured through  a  strong 
state. Thus, European  integration  is seen as the natural development of the french 
state, becoming even  more centralised “and endowed with a certain mission. If 
Europe is to become a political reality,  it will have to  take  on these [national/
identity] qualities.”  (Wæver  2005: 43). Different from  this conception, Germany  was 
through  the post-war  period keen  on decoupling  the state and the nation, creating 
strong safeguards against  any  recurrence of the “strong and heroised German 
state.”  (ibid: 48).  Following this, and a long  German history  of divided cultures, 
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1  The main body of literature to which we refer in this project, is developed not by Laclau and Mouffe themselves, but are 
developed by scholars which have directly attended the Essex School of Discourse Theory, led by Laclau & Mouffe, or 
scholars basing their research on this body of work developed. Thereby, though not referring directly to the foundational 
texts, we devote the original foundation of the framework to Laclau & Mouffe.
Germany  is generally  far  more prone to stronger  institution-building  within the EU, 
in  order  to counteract  a  strong conflation of state and national narratives,  by  cross-
cutting  authority  over  national borders - thus diminishing the re-emergence of 
strong national power projects.
These examples underline the importance of national  identity  for issues of regional 
integration, and the domestic  constructions of national projects of regional 
integration becomes central.  As Risse points out with  his focus on  multiple identities 
(Risse 2006; Bourne 2013), and in  connection  to this point,  these identities cannot 
be seen  as distinct and neatly  separated - any  construction  of a  regional project must 
be inherently  affected and produced through  its relation  to national  identities. 
Analytically, acknowledging  Risse’s ‘marble cake’ of identities also implies a certain 
sense of separation between  different  identities, remarkably  distinct  from  the nested 
conception. Identities are  not  just  neatly  separated, but  neither  do they  fit nicely 
within  each  other.  Thus,  a  possibility  of different  constructions of Europe - and the 
possibility  of these being  mutually  exclusive becomes apparent. In  the case of 
questioning  the future of the UK within  the EU, this enables a  discussion  and 
investigation of how  the public discourse enables a  British  membership within the 
Union. Where ‘national  European’ identities differ, the possibility  of exclusion exists 
and as such,  the articulation of regional identities becomes part of a  hegemonic 
struggle for the future of the EU and its members.
This focus once again  turns the discussion  upside down  - as a  hegemonic  struggle for 
European  identity  is ongoing,  this struggle between  countries’ conceptions of the EU 
concerns the articulation  and hegemonisation  of common  or  ‘overall’  European 
identity  illustrated by  the ‘nested’ conception of multiple identities. Finally, we end 
up with a mix  of the two conceptions of multiple identities - a  mix where the 
hegemonisation  of a  European  identity  creates an  overall identity  - the outer  rim  of 
the concentric circles - but  where national identities are highly  influential, and 
national European  identities that  do not  coincide with  this overall discourse is on  the 
rim  of the ‘outer’ identity. In  relation  to the UK’s future in  the EU,  the domestic 
public construction  of a  British  European  identity  becomes the center  of analysis - 
what  kind of European cooperation  is called for  and how  is this cooperation 
articulated in relation to the British national identity?
EXPLAINING CONTINGENCY AS OPPOSED TO CAUSALITY
Through  the use of Discourse Theory,  the focus will be shifted towards an  analysis of 
the contingency  and articulations of the universalistic ideals and imaginaries in  the 
construction  of national identity. “The unsolvable paradox”  of particularisms  and 
universalisms  (Laclau  1992) leads to a  focus on struggles between different forces 
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trying to establish  hegemony  within  the political field. This approach  does not  try  to 
explain  complex  policy  outcomes of the EU,  nor  does it  try  to explain  or  predict 
possible specific policy  outcomes,  but  rather  it  pertains to more overall questions of 
the possibility  of participation  and questions of the future of the EU and British 
membership. As Wæver (2005:35) puts it:
“The  aspiration is  not to explain the  detailed policy in an EU 
context, for example, on the colour of feta cheese. Since the 
unifying dynamic is that of ‘making sense’  and projecting oneself 
into the  future, this mode of analysis  is most relevant for over-
arching questions: what kind of Europe?”
Following  this logic,  the use of Discourse Theory  to explain  the position  of political 
actors,  and their  role in  the constructing  the future of the UK within  EU, aims at an 
examination of the different  discursive systems and their hegemonic  success in  order 
to account for their constraint on possible political articulations of a regional project.
As Wæver  (2004: 206; 2005) points out,  national  policies of regional integration  are 
highly  important for  outcomes of the regional  policies.  The different  national  policies 
must  be compatible in order  for  the regional  project  to succeed.  He points to the fact 
that  the regional  projects of the states does not necessarily  need to be identical,  but 
they  must  not  exclude the possibility  of each  other  to succeed, as with  his example of 
the french  development of a  “state-nation”  EU and a  strong  German  power state, 
decoupled from  specific national identities (Wæver 2005). Thus,  the possibility  of an 
overall  European identity  becomes possible,  as a  result  of the hegemonisation  of the 
construction  of a  European  project  that is encompassing  the states’ national  projects 
of EU.  As laid out,  the national identity  and national constructions are imperative for 
the outcomes of regional integration,  and in  the case of the UK, the nature of future 
British  membership becomes contingent  on the compatibility  of the British  and the 
hegemonic European project.
THE ESSEX SCHOOL OF DISCOURSE THEORY
In  order  to substantiate our  focus for  the analysis and our  conceptions of the creation 
and establishment  of the national discourse as important for  regional integration, we 
will elaborate on  post-structuralist  Discourse Theory, and argue how  this approach 
differs from the already outlined conceptions of identity.
A Critical Re-Reading of  Gramsci’s Hegemony
Central  for  the Essex School  of discourse theory  is a  critical and post-structuralist 
rereading of the marxist  conception of ideology  and Gramsci’s notion  of hegemony. 
In  classical marxism, ideology  is perceived as a  cloaking  of reality, and imposing false 
consciousness  that  covers up the reality  of social life: the material  and social 
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divisions between objective classes,  the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.  Ideology  is 
the creation  of illusions within  society  that  enable the maintenance of the status quo 
power  relations,  and furthermore creates ignorance for  the real and material motives 
behind social action  (Howarth  2000a: 87). For  Gramsci,  this inherently  critical 
notion of ideologies,  as being  first  and foremost  illusions that  enable the distortion  of 
material  and power  relations in  society, is too simplistic  and does not take into 
account the productive nature of ideologies as means of societal  change. In 
Gramscian  thought,  ideologies enable the organisation  of people through  creating 
consciousness of a  class’ struggles and position  within  the class society  (ibid: 89). 
Ideologies become bound to every  social  practice,  and as such  every  social  activity  is 
a  product  of ideology  “rather  than  imaginary  mental representations utterly  divorced 
from social practices” (ibid.).
Consequently, power  relations within society  does not  amount to only  a  product of 
material  distribution.  Rather, in order  for the bourgeoisie to maintain  power,  they 
must  manufacture  consent  of their  social power by  imposing their  ideology  on the 
rest  of society.  This new  notion  of class struggle,  leads to new  forms of power 
struggles: ideological battles between  social groups that transcend the borders of 
economic  classes. The construction  of ideological relationships and the hegemonic 
struggles between these ideologies become central for  change,  and the concept  of 
ideology  and politics is at  the same time widened to encompass more aspects of 
social interaction than only classical conception of politics as state politics (ibid: 90).
The Essex  School of discourse theory  departs from  this very  notion  of ideology  and 
posits it  as central  for  social  interaction,  and indeed for  the construction  of social 
reality.  By  first  deconstructing  the marxist  essentialist notion  of a  decoupling of 
economic  and materialist objectivity,  forming  social interaction and leading  to the 
mis-recognition of subjects’ position  in  society  created by  ideology,  discourse theory 
leads to the rejection of any  a priori separation between  logics of economic 
determination  and ideology.  Drawing  on  post-structuralist  notions and concepts, the 
Essex  School develops a  theory  of discourse that puts the plurality  of ideologies 
(discourses) at the centre, hereby excluding “ultimate determinacy” (ibid: 100).
Through  the use of the Derridean  notion  of deconstruction, the Essex  School 
framework provides a  framework  for  analysing  social interaction  without the need of 
referring to any  predetermined essentialist  core that  guide social behaviour. In  this 
notion lies a  rejection of the positivist  search  for  explaining  objectively  occurring 
phenomena  as truth,  by  asserting  that there is ‘nothing outside discourse’. Discourse 
theory  does not  argue that  there is no reality,  but  rather that  there can  not  be 
established any  truth about reality  that is outside social action or  discourse (Torfing 
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2005: 15-16).  The consequence of this anti-essentialist  starting  point  is a  social  field 
where identities, discourse and political  movements are created and understood in 
their  relation  to each  other. Any  construction  of meaning is necessarily  understood 
partly  by  what  it  excludes; its definition  of the inherent ‘other’ (Howarth  & 
Stavrakakis 2000: 9-10).
Analytical Concepts in Discourse Theory
This relational nature of social reality  negates the possibility  of total closure, 
complete objectivity,  as any  discursive construction  inherently  creates and maintains 
its antagonistic  ‘other’.  Central for  this thought, is discourse theory’s notions of 
antagonistic relations and the primacy  of politics within  social interaction: as any 
discourse or identity  is created through  hegemonic struggles to delegate meaning  to 
any  specific  discourse, the relational creation  of meaning  will  always imply  an 
exclusion or  relegation  of an  antagonistic  other,  and as such  it  is an exercise of 
political power, in its broadest sense (Torfing 2005: 15).
In  order  to constitute a  discourse,  it  is necessary  to articulate or  create an outside 
that  is constitutively different  from  the inside of the discourse. This creation  of an 
antagonistic other  stabilises the discourse itself,  by  establishing  borders and limits, 
and at  the same produces an  other that must  be understood as threatening  for  the 
stability  of the discourse itself (ibid: 16).  In  order  to analyse these created 
antagonistic relations, logics  of equivalence  and difference are introduced. The logic, 
or  chains,  of equivalence have two distinct  characteristics: on  the one hand they 
dilute differences between certain  groups or identities,  and on  the other hand co-
constitutively  construct  and strengthen  an  antagonistic  relation between  the inside 
and outside, by  establishing  equivalence through  a  common  difference from  the 
outside (Howarth  & Stavrakakis 2000: 11-13). This logic of the creation  of chains of 
equivalence are especially  in  understanding  the construction of antagonistic relations 
as it  introduces the logic  with  which both  the inside and the outside is constructed. 
As more and more elements within  a  differentiated discursive field is included in  the 
chain  of equivalence,  “it  becomes clear  that the excluded elements can  only  have one 
thing  in  common: they  pose a  threat  to the discursive system”  (Torfing  2005: 16). As 
Torfing  (ibid.) points out, these constructions of equivalence and the borders 
between  them, are quite clear  in modern politics,  where they  can clearly  be seen 
represented through  the creation  of stereotypical images of both  friends and 
enemies. Logics of difference on  the other  hand is,  as the opposite of the logic  of 
equivalence, explained as an  “expansion  of a  given  system  of differences by 
dissolving existing  chains of equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated 
elements into an  expanding  order”  - an order  establishing new  chains of equivalence 
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where all elements are constructed as opposite towards a  new  antagonistic  other 
(Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 11).
Finally,  social antagonisms inhibit  the total closure of social  reality  as the 
construction  of any  antagonistic relation  includes the apprehension  or  acceptance of 
the discourse as not fully  obtained (Howarth  & Stavrakakis 2000: 10). It  is this lack 
of closure that  is central for  understanding  Discourse Theory, as any  political 
practice attempts to fill  this void of meaning  and seeks closure. As all  created 
discourses or  identities are differential, in  that they  must rely  on  the construction of 
how  they  differ  from  any  other discourse,  the total ‘victory’ of the discourse will 
entail total integration  of all of society  to that  discourse.  And if all  identities are 
created through  their  differential relation  to other identities,  they  rely  on  particular 
universal ideals or  horizons  of meaning  that enable the particular  discourse to 
articulate its particular  representation  of universal  meaning (Laclau  1992). What  is 
central  when analysing the modern  social  practice then, is the hegemonic struggles 
between  particular  discourses to establish  universal meaning, and the impossibility 
of this total closure is the precondition  of modern  democracy  and any  societal 
practices (ibid: 90). Consequently  for analysis social  antagonisms present  us the 
borders and limits of the political  order, in  that they  constitute areas where the social 
objectivity  is no longer  stabilised as a  system  of peaceful different  moments, but are 
directly contested by its antagonistic others (Howarth 2000a: 106).
ARTICULATORY PRACTICES AND SIGNIFIED ELEMENTS
Central  for  the construction  of discourses is the concept  of articulation.  Articulation 
within  discourse theory  is any  practice that constructs a  relation  between  elements 
that  changes or  establish  their  meaning through  the ‘articulatory  practice’ (ibid: 7). 
Through  the establishment  of relations between nodal points, “privileged signifiers”, 
within  discourse, their  meaning becomes partially  fixed by  reference to central nodal 
points - empty signifiers. Empty  signifiers are central for  political  projects, and can 
most vividly  be seen in  populist and ideological  movements. The construction  of 
differentiated meanings of ‘justice’,  ‘liberty’ and ‘democracy’ are clear  examples. 
Through  time,  the  construction  of democracy  has taken  many  forms; direct 
democracy  in  communitarianism  through  liberal democracy  partially  fix  the meaning 
of nodal points within the discourse: A  concept  such  as ‘democratic practice’ or  ‘- 
accountability’ has two very  different  meanings within  such  discourses - but they  are 
nonetheless fixed in  meaning within  discursive systems by  relation  to the empty 
signifier  and its chain  of equivalence.  The articulation  of empty  signifiers and the 
inscription of meaning  to these from  different  groups relate to the above rereading  of 
Gramsci’s hegemony.
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These struggles are not as in  classical  marxism  the struggle of pre-destined social 
classes power within  society, but a  struggle between  discourses to establish  social 
objectivity through  the symbolic meaning of specific  nodal  points (Howarth  2000a: 
110-112).  In  relation  to democratic  practices this hegemonisation  of meaning  can  be 
understood not only  as a  case of exclusivity,  where antagonistic constructions of the 
hegemonic discourse is excluded from  the social order,  but  also through Mouffe’s 
(2005)  notion  of agonistic relations.  Whereas antagonistic relations rely  on  the 
mutual  exclusion  between  identities,  agonistic relations rely  on a  concept  of peaceful 
conflict that do not  exclude the constructed ‘others’.  This notion builds on  a  kind of 
layering  within  the discursive structures,  where the hegemonic discourse in  the 
classical sense of antagonistic exclusion  is ‘broad enough’ to include a  range of 
conflictual identities based on  different  universalist  horizons.  To Mouffe, this 
conception  of democracy  is central for  understanding modern  liberal  democracies, 
and in  this light  the same analytical tools from  discourse theory  applies to 
democratic conflict,  as those between parties on  the construction of European 
Integration.
POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITIES
By  referring to discourses and articulations as practices of structuring these, 
Discourse Theory  introduces an  analogical  relationship between  speech  (linguistic 
systems) and acts (social behaviour) (Howarth  2000a: 87).  This relationship 
introduces both theoretical  and epistemological/methodological points. The first 
theoretical  points leads to a  key  understanding  of subjectivity  and agency. Subjects 
have non-essential  characteristics and are  only  formed through  the interpellation  of a 
multiplicity  of discourses and identities which  the subject  is exposed to. But  rather 
than  just being the product of underlying  social  structures,  through  this concept of 
subject positions, the subject  also partake in  the creation, articulation  and 
rearticulation  of discourses through  the concept  of political subjectivity and 
dislocation.
The concept of dislocation  refers to the given  point  in which  the contingency  of the 
discourse is exposed,  and induces a  crisis for  the discourse, or  identity  crisis for  the 
subject,  where the moments within  the discourse  lose their  fixed meaning  and 
relation to each  other,  and becomes in need of rearticulation. For  the second point, 
as every  act,  be it  a  verbal  articulation, certain  modes of practice or  even  a 
materialised symbolic structure, is created in  relation  to social practices and relations 
(discourse) it  partakes in  the articulation  or  re-articulation  of these,  and are not  just 
linguistic or ‘material’ structures (ibid: 100-102; Torfing 2005: 14-15).
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Following  this logic  there is in  every  articulation  within a  discourse,  ingrained the 
inherent  symbolic logic of the discourse,  and as such  every  articulation, no matter 
how  insignificant it  might have been  in  its hegemonic establishment,  are “surfaces 
for  the inscription of discourse”  (Stavrakakis 2005: 81).  As Wæver  (2005: 35)  argues, 
this enables the analyst  to transcend the line so often asserted between  what is said, 
and was it  really  meant by  the actors: texts and political articulations reaffirm  the 
structures of the discourse and “structures within  discourse condition  possible 
policies” (ibid.).
THE CONTINGENT NATURE OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES
What  we can  see from  this short outline of key  concepts of discourse theory  leads to a 
more nuanced and more contingent  understanding  of national identity  and its 
relation to regional  integration,  as discussed by  the theories in  the preceding chapter. 
Paramount  for  this (more complex) conception  of the construction  of identities and 
discourses is the historicist  and contingent construction  of these (Torfing 2005: 14). 
Precisely  because the construction  of identities are contingent and relational, any 
analysis and thorough examination  must  take into account, or  at  least be aware of, 
the historical  and contingent  nature of the discourse. Thus, the construction  of 
national identities, sedimented traditions of constitutional preference and historical 
constructions of identities provides a  backdrop for  the construction  of new 
discourses,  and as such the historical  contingency  of articulations must  be taken  into 
account: Historical constructions of such  concepts of democracy  or  political 
economical issues within  the EU might be constructed differently  within different 
countries, as the contingent nature or  historical constructions of these concepts are 
different within  different nations (Rosamond & Wincott,  2006; Wæver 2004).  This 
notion of contingency  in  every  discursive construction has clear  implications for 
Hooghe & Marks’ conception  of the issue of identity  in  European  Integration.  They 
argue that ‘publics’ and ‘elites’ are endowed with  somewhat static identities which 
they  are able to account  for  through  statistics.  As described,  they  argue that the near 
rejections of the Maastricht  treaty  showed how  the elites were not ‘in tune’ with  the 
national identity.
What  discourse theory  enables, is a  nuanced analysis of the construction  and 
relational  nature of these identities, and thus changes the nature of the question: 
rather  than  asking  what  constitutes the different identities,  discourse theory  ask how 
these identities are constructed, articulate themselves, and as such also creates a 
contingent relation  between public  and elite identities.  Why  we will not  argue that 
Hooghe & Marks account of identities are an  outright  wrong approach,  instead we 
will posit that their  analysis will  be unable to show  how  the politicisation  of 
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European  Integration has been  established and continuously  rearticulated through 
political speech  acts.  As such  it  also misses accounts of how  the European Union is 
not a static entity  but  rather  an ongoing  process of constant re-articulation and 
hegemonic struggles.  We argue, as Rosamond & Wincott,  that  we must move from  an 
analytical  status quo of ‘pro’ or  ‘con’ EU, but rather focus on re-articulations and 
politicisation  of ‘what  kind of’ Europe.  This enables an escape from  a  static 
conception  of the EU because the ‘for  or  against’ debate implies that  there is only  one 
static form  of EU rather than an  infinite multitude of possible developments 
contingent on  popular  constructions and hegemonic struggles of nations,  publics and 
politics (Carey 2002: 395; Bourne 2012).
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYTICAL POSSIBILITIES
Analysing national political  articulations of European projects from  this perspective, 
does present a  few  issues stemming from  the post-structuralist  basis of the 
framework. As Wæver  (2004: 207) rightly  points out,  taking a point of departure in 
governmental politics and parliamentary  figures as primary  sources, involves the 
assertion  of some form  of primacy  of national  politics rather  than  say  societal 
interest groups in  forming  national identity,  and as such the approach  somewhat 
reintroduces some structural  notions of layers, found within liberal inter-
governmentalism  and realism. This inherent primacy  of states is clearly  not strictly 
in  line with  a  post-structuralist and anti-essentialist  epistemology.  But,  as Wæver, we 
stress that these different  levels of discursive structures should not  be analysed 
independently,  but rather  be taken into account  when analysing structured logics 
within  the discourse,  and how  some levels constrain and influence others - in  order 
to evaluate any  articulations as being more or  less radical in  terms of impact  to 
structures.
The point  of the analysis is not  to outline and deconstruct political  developments up 
until  now, in  some strict  Foucauldian archeological  sense, but rather  to use tools 
from  discourse analysis to analyse how  the constructed ideas of a  British  Europe 
affects the current articulations as well as their  possible political  outcomes. This 
approach  to the use of discourse  analysis in analyses of European  Integration is also 
pursued by  other  authors such  as Diez Medrano and his pragmatic  schema  of ideal 
type discourses on  Europe (Wæver, 2004: 204)  closely  related to Hay  & Rosamond’s 
work  on  and identification of 4  different  discourses of globalization  found in  Europe 
(2002). In  order  to substantiate our  approach  we draw  on  Wæver’s (2004)  work  on 
discourse analysis as foreign  policy  theory,  complementing  the more traditional post-
structuralist  approach  to analysing  IR and European  Integration, that  pertains to 
much more grand questions within theory.
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We want  to escape the critique of post-structuralist  discourse analysis as being 
relativist  and focused on  deconstruction of everything into  nothing,  but rather to use 
the tools and concepts provided to show  how  question  of identity  construction  and 
discursive structures can  be beneficial when  analysing present  and future 
developments within European  Integration.  Doing this we introduce a  perspectivist 
instead of a  relativist  approach  and draw  inspiration from  earlier studies and 
identification  of discourses rather  than  use  them  as objective list  from  which  one can 
identify  specific elements. In  the following  chapter  we will shortly  outline how  we 
will use this approach  in  practice providing  an explanation for  our  analytical 
strategy.
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
In  this chapter  we intend to shortly  map out our  analytical strategy  rather  than 
methodology  and by  doing that  try  to also make our  conception  of theory  clearer. 
This strategy  thus illuminates how  we have constructed our  area  of inquiry  and does 
not make out  a  framework from  which we can  draw  out  objective truths about  right 
or  wrong but rather  to problematize existing  understandings and detect  contingent 
patterns of logics.
We thus construct our  analysis by  linking  a historical investigation  with  a 
contemporary  in  depth  analysis of the way(s)  in  which  the European  Union  is 
articulated in  British  politics.  We do this with  reference to Wævers conception  of the 
synchronic and the diachronic  steps of analysis.  This introduces a  rather  narrow 
focus on  british  relations only  and thus falls somewhat short  in  investigating  the co-
constitutiveness of the relation  between the EU and the UK.  As pointed out  by 
Rosamond & Wincott  such  research  agenda  as ours invites for  comparative analyses 
in  order to detect  the national peculiarities and highlight  their  differences (2006: 10). 
Due to the practical limitation  of this paper  in  both  time and words we have chosen 
to pursue a  more in-depth  single case study.  By  introducing  the two-step model by 
Wæver  we would argue that our  analysis opens up for  important  evaluations of the 
significance of the present  debate and thus offers an  important  contribution the 
study of Britain in Europe.
The synchronic  step refers to a  first  reading of both  political texts as well as 
intellectual accounts of the given  area of interest  which  establishes the possibility  of 
drawing out  some inner  logics that  sustain  over  time as well  as locating  what  is left 
out.  This will often  function  as a  historical account  that  enables the analyst  to move 
on  to the diachronic  step.  This second step involves a  closer  reading  of specific  issues 
that  are put into relation  and context with  the logical structures of the discourses 
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outlined in  the first step.  This enables an  analytical  construction of how 
contemporary  debates are structured in  relation to historical events and entails 
questions and interpretation  of the contemporary  (re)articulations’ relation  to these 
inner logics.
Specifically,  we will focus our  synchronic  analyses upon three historical periods in 
time: the UK’s entering  into the EU, the Maastricht Treaty  and the contemporary 
discussions of an  in-or-out  referendum. However,  as Simon  Bulmer  & Martin Burch 
writes with  regards to the period around the British  accession  to the EEC: “accession 
was not  a "big-bang" event,  since adjustment  had begun  before accession”  (Bulmer & 
Burch, 2005: 1) arguing  that  an  analyses of the British  accession  can not  focus 
strictly  on  the year  of accession. We follow  the same line of thought  and our  use of 
the periods as focal points for  our analysis will thus also have to be considered as a 
loose guide rather than a methodological recipe.
We will  collect our  data by  using the so-called snowball-method as e.g.  laid out by 
Kennet Lynggaard (2010: 138). This involves reading a  number  of key  texts starting 
with  academic accounts of the given  period in  time. The purpose is then to follow  the 
references to other texts to repeat  the procedure and end up with  a more or less 
dense web of the texts at the time.  This method,  however,  opens for an  infinite 
amount  of data  and any  analyst will have to make crucial choices of when  to stop and 
what  to prioritise. Our  choices, in  this regard,  will be based on  an  outspoken  interest 
in the elite-level articulations of party leaders and prominent politicians.
This will be followed by  the diachronic analysis in  which  we will seek to establish 
some of the patterns that  have either  changed or  sustained themselves over  time.  We 
will do this by  utilising  the analytical concepts of the Laclau  & Mouffe as laid out  on 
the previous pages.  This will be followed up by  a  discussion of the implications of the 
inner  logics of the discursive constructs of the European  Union  are for  the political 
possibilities of both UK and EU.
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HISTORICAL LOGICS OF DISCOURSE IN THE UK
“British political discourse  has tended to  ‘exogenise’  European 
integration in the  sense  that it has historically been presented as 
the  work of others, thereby enabling a rather crude  ‘us’ versus 
‘them’  (‘Europe’) dialectic to infect the public and media imagery of 
the  European debate  in British politics” (Rosamond & Hay, 2002: 
18).
This is how  Ben  Rosamond & Colin  Hay  describe some of the overall patterns of 
British  political  discourse on  the European  Union  emphasising  the historical 
construction  of the UK as being ‘exogenous’ to Europe. In the following chapter  we 
will take this historical relationship up to evaluation  and try  to outline some of the 
significant historical  events in  the UK’s relationship with  Europe and the EU before 
and around the time of the UK’s entry  into the European  Economic Community 
(EEC)  in  1973.  We will  do this in  order  to identify  some of the logics inherent  in  the 
discourses.  It  will be based on  a  reading  of parts of the extensive amount of academic 
literature on  the British  relationship with  the Union, as well as public speeches and 
debate by  prominent political actors. Using other  academic accounts of course 
carries with  it  the risk of determining  the categories and themes of inquiry  as Wæver 
criticises some of the work by  Thomas Diez for  doing  when he introduces static 
categories or  what  Wæver  deems ‘un-discursive’ ideal types (Wæver, 2004: 204).  On 
the other  hand it  can also be a  big challenge to ‘find’ discourses and avoid circular 
arguments if the empirical  material should ‘steer’ such  on its own  - especially  when 
working  with  a  subject such as UK’s relationship to the EU involving  an immense 
amount  of material. Furthermore: “Claims  about history are claims  about the 
present and, as such,  may well carry within them  logics  of ‘necessity’ and 
‘appropriateness’” (Rosamond, 2007: 25).
We seek  to meet  these challenges by  finding some middle  way  and by  adhering  to 
Wævers conception  of the synchronic step followed by  the diachronic.  We thus 
pursue to let our  categories or  themes be formed by  the reading  of primary  material 
as in  the speeches and parliamentary  debates of prominent politicians whilst  at  the 
same time acknowledging that we are influenced by  our own subjectivities and thus 
also the readings of earlier  academic accounts of the area. This challenge,  however, 
also gives strength  to the analysis in  combining  the construction  of a  historical 
analysis together with  a  contemporary  discussion.  It  provides us with  the possibility 
of constructing  a  framework  outside, what  Rosamond refers to as,  “the dictums of 
Kuhnian ‘normal science’”  (Ibid.), and thus seek to problematise existing  patterns 
and insist on  asking  ‘how’ instead of ‘why’ to our  objects of enquiry. In  the chapter  we 
will argue that the debate on  British  EU-membership and -participation  can 
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beneficially  be structured into 4  main themes: modern  political history,  governance, 
sovereignty, political economy.
MODERN POLITICAL HISTORY
In  this chapter  we will seek  to combine the two fields of contemporary  history  and 
political science in  order  to construct  a  historical  narrative of the British  relationship 
to the EU.  This approach  opens up the opportunity  to understand the British  state 
not only  in  terms of objective or  material  interests but  also as an  effect  of sedimented 
historical particularities and conceptions.
PRE- AND POST-SECOND WORLD WAR ARTICULATIONS
Ideas of European  Integration  is not  only  a  post-second-world-war  phenomenon  but 
have been approached by  intellectuals for  many  centuries.  Bache et al.  make the 
example of Abbé de Saint  Pierre’s Project  for  Perpetual Peace in the 18th  century  as 
one of the first  mentionings of the possibilities and benefits of a  European  Union  also 
followed, in  less explicit  terms, by  Jean-Jacques Rousseau  (Bache et  al.  2011: 81). 
Although  intellectuals offered ideas about  larger  communities ‘across’ borders, as a 
means for  maintaining peace and prosperity,  such projects for  unity  often  took the 
form  of domination  from  conquest  by  one nation  over  the others; with  the most 
common examples being  Napoleon’s as well as Hitler’s ideas of European  unity. 
Between  the first and second world war  arrangements such  as the League of Nations 
did however  seek to establish  a  mechanism  able to sustain  peaceful coexistence 
between  nation  states - with a  focus on  political  settlements rather  than  integration. 
However,  as Bache et  al.  argue,  the failure of the League of Nations did,  together  with 
the rise of nationalism  in  the 20’s and 30’s and the outbreak of the second world war, 
destroy  many  hopes for  European  Integration  (ibid.: 82).  Just  as much  as such  hope 
was destroyed, it  was reinforced and strengthened by  the potential benefits of 
economic  and political integration  that  followed after  the second world war. Amongst 
other  reasons one was the enormous need for reconstruction of industrial 
infrastructure as well  as governance systems. Leaders and governments that had 
collaborated with the nazi’s were displaced and most  of the western European 
countries abandoned strong notions of nationality.
With  the economic and social  dislocation  of the period right after  the war  much 
political change was thus suddenly  possible and followingly  pushed for  by  different 
interest groups by  Bache et al referred to as a  “mood of change”  (Bache et al. 2011: 
83).  The ‘mood of change’ spread,  not  alone to those countries in  which  governments 
were displaced,  but  also to countries that  had functioning,  and indeed popular, 
governments. In  the UK a Labour  government was elected despite the huge 
popularity  of the war  hero Churchill  as Conservative party  leader.  Bache et  al.  argues 
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that  this mood did, in  fact  in  particular, benefit  the parties of the left together  with 
parties that  dismissed nationalism  as a  legitimate political project  replaced by 
federalist  ideas.  The UK and the Scandinavian  countries did,  however,  break the 
pattern  as they  did not denounce the idea  of nationalism  only  following the leftist 
turn  as in  the rest  of Europe (ibid.: 83).  This can  be attributed to many  causes, 
amongst  the most significant maybe the fact that  the Labour  government  after  a 
range of nationalisations during  the war  succeeded in  taking  this agenda  even  further 
and nationalised the coal and steel industries (Childs,  2012: 14). Also, they  had not 
been  invaded,  fascism  had not taken a  hold,  and the war was fought  as a  national  war 
(Bache et  al.  2011: 84).  The war  experience in  particular  proved to be significant in 
the development  of the relationship between  Britain  and the EU as we will elaborate 
more on  further down, here noted by  MP Arthur  Woodburn  in  a  speech  to the 
Commons in  1962: “Although Britain suffered great damage during the war, it was 
never occupied by foreign troops, whereas every country in Europe was  occupied 
by foreign troops,  and the people of Europe are desperately anxious to  find some 
way of preventing further wars  and the rise of other dictators. We are not as 
alarmed about this as people on the Continent” (Woodburn, 1962: 1052).
Having  explored only  a  few  of the ‘reasons’ for  these developments,  we will  now  turn 
to identify  how  these developments manifested themselves in  the articulations of 
supranational cooperation  by  the leading  politicians and followingly  what  logics such 
articulations entailed, how and if they pertained over time.
CHURCHILL AND BRITAIN: SPONSORS OF EUROPE
’’We  must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only 
will hundreds  of millions of toilers be  able  to regain the  simple  joys 
and hopes which make  life  worth living. The  structure  of the 
United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be  such as  to 
make  the  material strength of a single  state  less important. Small 
nations will count as much as large  ones  and gain their honor by 
their contribution to the common cause’’ (Churchill, 1946)
This quote by  Winston  Churchill  is one of the most  famous when discussing  his 
approach  to the European Union.  Indeed, Churchill can  rightfully  be spoken  of as a 
great  proponent of European  unity  through  his efforts right after  the end of the 
second world war  - in  many  regards opposing  the Labour  government  in  place 
between  1945-51  that  concentrated their  efforts on national matters (Butler  & Butler, 
2005).  Churchill’s ideas followed the aspirations of other  European  movements, 
especially  the European Union  of Federalists formed in  1946  that sought to exploit 
the political dislocations in  much of Europe and quickly  establish  different  political 
structures than  that  of the nation  states by  creating a  federal  constitution  for  Europe. 
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In  1948  the Hague Congress was held with  participation  of delegates from  the 
various European countries with the purpose of attaining  such  a  constitution. 
Winston  Churchill was Honorary  President  for  the congress and thus faced an 
important role in  facilitating the different interests and ideas about the political 
future of Europe.  It  proved that the aspirations of the European  Union of Federalists 
could not be realised and,  as Bache et  al argue, especially  the reluctance from  the 
British  was a  crucial factor  in  this process (2011: 85). Churchill  did, despite being  a 
firm  believer  in  European  Unity, have some restrictions when it  came to the role of 
the UK. In the end of the speech referred to above he ends it by stating that:
“The  first step in the  re-creation of the  European family must be  a 
partnership between France  and Germany” continuing “In all this 
urgent work France  and Germany must take the  lead together […] 
Great Britain […] must be  friends  and sponsors of the  new Europe 
and must champion its right to live and shine” (Churchill, 1946).
And with another famous quote from 1930:
“We  see nothing but good and hope  in a richer, freer, more 
contented European commonality. But we  have  our own dream 
and our own task. We are  with Europe, but not of it. We  are linked 
but not compromised. We  are interested and associated but not 
absorbed” (Churchill in Bideleux & Taylor, 1996: 36).
Articulations by  Prime minister  Clement Attlee, Prime Minister  from  1945-51,  show 
that  the discourse of being  the sponsor and saviour  of European  prosperity  was not 
only  a  logic integrated within  the conservative party  but  also at  the other ‘side’ of the 
political spectrum. Here he addresses the Labour  Party  on  the issue of the Common 
Market in 1967:
“The  Common Market. The so-called Common Market of six 
nations. Know them all well. Very recently this country spent a 
great deal of blood and treasure  rescuing four of 'em from attacks 
by the other two” (Attlee in Hennessy, 2001: 173)
These early  articulations of the project of the EEC as well as the overall  project  for 
European  Unity  in  its different  forms most  often  entailed a  logic in  which  continental 
European  politics was considered as exogenous to British  politics.  Most  discourse 
also tended to portray  British  history  as being  exceptional, especially  with  regards to 
the war  experience which  also lead to the  establishment of a  binary  hierarchy  in 
which  Europe takes the role  of the ‘other’ over  which  Britain  has some responsibility. 
In  this way  a  logic  was established within  which  Britain  could not be an integral part 
of European  development  or  what Hooghe & Marks would deem  an  Exclusive 
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Identity.  As we will show, the allegiance of the British  was at  this time closely 
connected to the Commonwealth and the US.
ECONOMIC RATIONALES, COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In  1961  Harold Macmillan  and the Conservative party  decided that  the UK should 
apply  for  membership of the EEC, but  the french president Charles de Gaulle vetoed 
the application, arguing  “that [UK’s] strong link to  the USA as  well as  the  British 
Commonwealth could hinder the  British in their dedication to  the EEC”  (Perisic, 
2010: 4-5).  According  to Robert Cooper, Macmillan’s reason  for  applying  was that he 
was concerned for  Britain’s place in  the world and that he saw  the EEC as “the centre 
of gravity in Europe and the centre of US attention”  (Cooper,  2012: 1192). It  was not 
only  Macmillan who believed in  joining  the EEC, the leader  of the Liberal Party 
Grimond was maybe one of the most eager proponents of British  membership. 
However  his goals of the membership were restricted to economic calculations,  as he 
says: “[the EEC’s] field of action is  economic,  but of course  to harmonise economic 
policies  one must accept some political decisions“  (Grimond,  1960).  By  arguing with 
the use of strict  economic  rationales he was also able to make a  chain  of equivalence 
between  the EEC and the interests of the Commonwealth: “The Commonwealth 
wants  two things – trade and capital. It is  important for the Commonwealth not to 
be cut off from  the most rapidly expanding market in the world.”  (Ibid.). He thus 
represents a  line of argumentation  or  identity  which  one might deem  inclusive in  the 
words of Hooghe & Marks. Macmillan  advances some of the same arguments with 
regards to the economic benefits but  also discusses joining  as a part  of global power 
relations:
“If we remain outside  the  European Community, it seems to me 
inevitable  that the realities  of power would compel our American 
friends to attach increasing weight to the  views and interests of 
the  Six in Europe, with others who may join them, and to  pay less 
attention to our own.“ (Macmillan, 1962)
Such a  logic can  beneficially  be related to what Rosamond & Hay  (2002: 16),  with 
regards to Globalisation, describes as an  “Inevitable/inexorable process  (non-
negotiable)” in  invoking arguments about  e.g.  “the realities  of power”.  Both 
Macmillan’s as well as the arguments of Grimond thus describe global economic 
developments as processes that  will have to be responded to - even  out  of their 
hands; their  answer being  to join  the EEC.  Gaitskell  notes this in  a  debate in  the 
House of Commons in 1962: “Political and economic consequences  are being 
paraded to  suggest that we have  no option”  (Gaitskell, 1962a: 1022). In this way  the 
project of the EEC and later  EU thus becomes a  means for obtaining other  goals, 
such  as economic  growth or balancing of power,  and not  an  end in itself. The 
37
arguments of Gaitskell, in  this period, also follow  the logic  of being  constrained by 
external factors but that such have to be countered:
“I  still hope  for entry on our terms. [...] But we must fight for them. 
[...] Do not forget that if we want their markets they want ours; 
that for broad political reasons some of these  countries are 
anxious that we  should enter. There is  no need for us to beg. We 
must get away from this  "inevitability" approach that of course  we 
are going in. Nothing could be  more  fatal to the  fulfilment of our 
conditions” (Gaitskell, 1962a: 1022)
And later in 1975 by Harold Wilson, PM, in a speech in the House of Commons:
“our survival, [...] the  future  of our country and its influence in the 
world all depend in the  last resort [staying in the  EEC], on how we 
respond as  a nation to  a challenge which is part external, part 
internal - the challenge  to the  resolve  and resource  of the  people  of 
Britain” (Wilson, 1975)
Europe is once again portrayed as exogenous to the British  political  sphere with  the 
use of a  we/they  dichotomy  and involvement  is caused,  to a  large degree, by  external 
factors that  are countered by  involvement  in  order  to maintain  the national interests 
- not  to take part  in  co-authorship of the project.  As Wæver  puts it: “Britain has not 
really joined in the
competition for the formation of the image of Europe”  (2005: 51). Furthermore, any 
involvement  should be acted out  through  intergovernmental  negotiations,  in  which 
sovereignty  could be kept: “Let me make it plain that what we are saying is  not that 
we decide  our foreign policy in a vacuum. We have allies. [...] We have the 
Commonwealth. We have a balance of power in the world.  [...] But we decide and 
announce it [foreign policy] by ourselves at present.  Even in the E.E.C.  or O.E.C.D. 
there are  no majority decisions. The decisions have to  be unanimous.  If we accept 
what they say, it is because we agree with it.” (Gaitskell, 1962a: 1052)
Relating these articulations to Rosamond & Hay’s mappings of discourses on 
globalisation  it  makes sense to identify  his portrait  of the EEC as a  “contingent 
process or tendency to which counter- tendencies  might be  mobilised”  (2002: 16) by 
focusing on  the strong conditions,  introduced as a  way  of maintaining  national 
interests.  Rosamond & Hay  also identifies this logic in  the later  British  approach  to 
European  Union summits arguing that  especially  John Major and Margaret Thatcher 
saw  participation  as a  “rearguard action in defence of the national interest rather 
than as engagement in the (co-) authorship of a European project”  (Rosamond & 
Hay, 2002: 18).
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These articulations,  are as we see also closely  connected to the UK’s relationship with 
the Commonwealth  and the US. This connection  was by  Grimond and Macmillan 
often  described as only  an economic relation, but as MP Thomas Moore points out in 
a  debate in  the House of Commons in  1962, the relation  also meant  ‘something more: 
“The  Commonwealth countries  are admittedly tied to us by sentiment in some cases 
and by powerful memories  of mutual effort,  sacrifice and achievement, together 
with the common bond of headship provided by the Queen” (Moore, 1962: 1071). 
This imagery  of a  strong connection  to the outer  world was a  great  challenge to the 
possible integration  into a  closed regional  community  and symbolic  arguments were 
often  used to counter  economic arguments.  As Gaitskell’s comments, in  the same 
debate, show, the Labour’s scepticism  to joining  the EEC was not  founded in  closed 
off nationalist ideas but were better characterised as of a global outlook:
“We  wanted a larger Europe; not just seven, but ten, or eleven, or 
twelve, as the case may be. We  wanted a Europe  not cut off, but 
closely linked with the  outside  world through the Commonwealth. 
We  wanted a Europe  with a special sense of responsibility to 
developing countries. We  wanted a Europe  with lower tariffs  all 
round and thinking of itself in a world setting; not concentrating 
on its  own particular selfish interests. We  wanted a Europe that 
involved a looser association” (Gaitskell, 1962a: 1005).
In  his speech,  Gaitskell also invokes the logic  of the EEC as first and foremost  a 
Western European  project, from  which Britain  is not  only  distanced geographically 
but also by  power  balances.  The relations that matter  to the British  are the one on  a 
global stage,  between East  and West, and they  will not be changed by  joining  the 
EEC:
“We  do not think that the  unity or disunity of Western Europe  is 
really going to determine the great issues which, as I  think we  all 
know, relate  to the relations between East and West, and the 
relations between rich and poor countries” (Ibid.).
Those who favour a  Britain  outside the EEC with  a stronger  connection  to 
Commonwealth  often  invoke symbolic as well as arguments of sentiment; the Queen, 
‘Friendship’,  the Commonwealth  as democratic,  responsibility, etc.  These arguments 
are often  countered with  the use of rationalist economic arguments as those invoked 
by  Grimond, entailing little symbolic value. They  thus make use of binary  oppositions 
in  the construction  of their  identities as either  inclusive or  exclusive to other 
identities.
In  the early  years of the EEC we can  identify  some important  logics in  the discourse 
of the British  politicians.  The EEC is first  and foremost  portrayed as an  exogenous 
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entity  built by  and relating  to the continental European  countries,  especially  France 
and Germany  and is not  followed by  a  logic of being  co-authors to the project. 
Significantly,  this logics seems to fit  across party  dividing lines as well  as opinion  of 
whether to or  not to join. The debate about whether  to join  this entity  or  not,  is 
characterised by  a divide between instrumental calculations of different  types of 
benefits and those invoking  also symbolic arguments about  the British  connection to 
Commonwealth. In  the following  chapters we will elaborate on  the different 
discursive logics,  starting  with  the construction  of British  politics as exceptional, 
distinctly  linear  and unitary  developments vis-a-vis  those of continental  Europe, 
following WWII.
EU AS THE END OF BRITISH HISTORY?
“We  must be  clear about this; [accession to  the  Community] does 
mean, if this is the idea, the  end of Britain as an independent 
European state. I  make  no apology for repeating it. It means  the 
end of a thousand years of history" (Gaitskell 1962)
For  Gaitskell, this end of Britain  as an  independent  European state is closely 
connected to the historical  developments of the UK as a  nation  - something  also 
brought  out  as a central issue in  much  scholarly  work on  the topic (Schmidt  2006: 
30).  This connotation  of European  Integration  to the end of an  'independent 
European  state' is in  a  contingent  relation  with  the country's past. At the advent of 
European  integration in  the wake of the Second World War, one of the main  causes 
for  increased integration  was to establish  a cooperative nature between  France and 
Germany  so as to suture the wounds of the war, and hereby  create  possibilities of 
peaceful political and economic futures for these war-torn countries.
EU as a Western European Project
The British  image of a  European  project is projected as a  Western  European  one, 
reconciling relations between  France and Germany, with  the UK as an  important  co-
sponsor,  but quite definitely  not  as a central member.  Churchill, in  his speech  at  the 
University  of Zurich, proposed this German-French  reconciliation and destined this 
as the main  foundation  for  any  union of European  Countries (Churchill 1946). 
Churchill does not in this speech  incline any  notion  of the UK as participating in the 
formation  of this new  "United States of Europe", but rather he explicitly  states that 
Britain "must be friends and sponsors of the new  Europe" (ibid).  The UK is seen 
rather  as a saviour  of Europe, and with  a  distinct  historical linear  development  as a 
unitary  state,  with  unitary  political  obligations with  a  strong  global  outlook. The 
discontinuation  of continental European  political  developments has not  affected the 
UK in  the same way; rather oppositely  the end of WWII marked not  a  weakening  of 
national borders for  the UK but  rather  a  strengthening  of its borders through  victory 
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leading  to articulations of a  distinct and rather  exceptional  nature of British  history 
vis-a-vis continental Europe states.
In  British  eurosceptic  discourse, a  strong connection between national, unitary 
sovereignty  and the history  of the UK is discernable through  articulations of British 
relations with  the EU. The UK is not  represented as having  the same history  as the 
European  continent - its political  and economic systems were not abolished in the 
Second World War,  but  rather,  the UK has been  seen  rather  as a  saviour  of the 
European  continent; as the country  from  which the liberation  of Europe was 
mounted:      
“It was  British support to resistance movements  throughout the 
last War that helped to keep alive the flame  of liberty in so  many 
countries until the day of liberation. … And it was from our island 
f o r t r e s s t h a t t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f E u r o p e  i t s e l f w a s 
mounted.” (Thatcher 1988)
This quote illuminates the articulation of a  strong  connection  between  the UK’s 
historical importance as an  independent  nation, participating  in  the regional matters 
of Europe and the country’s present  role in  international affairs.  Throughout  modern 
history,  whether fighting Nazi Germany  or  aiding  in  the fall of the Iron  Curtain  in 
Eastern  Europe, the UK has been  portrayed as a  strong and independent  nation  with 
a strong national character.
“Over the  years, Britain has made her own, unique contribution to 
Europe. We have provided a haven to those  fleeing tyranny and 
persecution. And in Europe’s  darkest hour, we  helped keep the 
flame of liberty alight.
In more  recent decades, we  have played our part in tearing down 
the  Iron Curtain and championing the  entry into  the  EU of those 
countries that lost so many years to  Communism. And contained 
in this history is the  crucial point about Britain, our national 
character, our attitude to Europe” (Cameron 2013).
From  Churchill  through  Gaitskell  and Thatcher to Cameron, the historical political 
and regional importance of the UK is drawn  out  as a unique feature of the country’s 
history  and identity. This important feature of the UK in  regional matters creates a 
clear  distinction  between  the UK and the rest  of Europe - a  country  enduring  its 
independent  political  and societal  organisational development  through  centuries of 
conflict and threats from continental Europe.
Late British Accession - Accession as Acceptance
When the EU in its original form  was defined,  it was done so without  the UK, 
establishing  certain  rules,  that  as such are not changeable (Perisic,  2010: 3),  which 
41
was and still  is a  source  of conflict  for  newcomers to the integrational project.  Perisic 
argue that one must acknowledge that  “every country has a certain idea of its  role 
in the world,  which  shapes  its  identity and the  way it sees itself in relation to other 
countries.” (ibid: 2).  For  British  political  elites one of these ‘identities’ has been its 
historical importance.  One sees this form  of argumentation  in  the above mentioned 
section  derived from  David Cameron’s speech  on  the EU (Cameron,  2013). Britain 
did,  as opposed to Germany  that  needed a  change of image following the second 
world war,  seek  to establish  a  continuation  of its former  influence (Perisic, 2010: 
2-4).  One sees the same when  warnings arise in  the speeches made by  Gaitskell  and 
Thatcher  as to what consequences further  integration would have upon  the history  of 
the UK, for  Gaitskell in  joining, and for Thatcher,  the ratification  of the Maastricht 
Treaty:
“What does federation mean? It means that powers are taken from 
national governments and to federal parliaments. [...] we  are  no 
more  than a state  (as it were) in the  United States of Europe, such 
as Texas and California” (Gaitskell, 1962)
“To try to suppress  nationhood and concentrate power at the 
centre of a European conglomerate  would be highly damaging [...] 
Europe  will be  stronger precisely because it has France  as France, 
Spain as  Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its  own customs, 
traditions and identity” (Thatcher, 1988)
Concludingly, we can  discern a  continuation  of the established political discourses 
vis-a-vis  a  strongly  dislocated political environment within  continental  Europe, 
which  was in  dire need of a re-articulation  and re-construction of their  political 
nature and agenda. The EU is articulated as first and foremost a  western  European 
project centered around French/German reconciliation, leading  towards peaceful 
relations on the continent  and circumventing  the possibility  of rising nationalist  state 
projects.  The political institutions of the UK had endured through  the War  and the 
country  was seen  rather  as a  victor  of the war than  a victim. For  continental  Europe, 
political identities underwent  strong dislocations leading  to re-articulations, as seen 
in  the French/German reconciliation  that  weakened national borders as well as the 
advent of a  European  Community. The British  articulation, or  the apparent  ‘lack’ of 
any  need of re-articulations of the British  political identities in  European  history, is 
sedimented in  political discourses in  the UK as separated from  most of these 
European  developments and have rather  been  connected to global  developments. 
What  should be emphasised here is the political distancing  from  integration  based on 
a  clear argument of it  leading to a  discontinuation  and dislocation  of British  linear 
development. This articulation of Britain’s position in  global or  regional  relations is 
conceived of as not  in  need of imminent  re-articulations and unitariness is not 
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necessarily  connected to nationalist  or  critical developments,  but rather  as a 
continuation  of British  influence and historical importance, as opposed to 
continental Europe, where these developments lead to nationalist  regimes and war. 
As such there is established an  apparent  antagonistic relation  created as an us/them 
dichotomy  between unitary  and linear  British  developments not in  need of political 
rearticulation  and on  the other  hand a  dislocated and demolished continental 
European  political landscape in need of political  refurbishment  and rearticulation, 
caused by a disruption in their developments.
Another  point of discussion  in  relation  to sovereignty  issues,  are questions of 
governance.  Many  academic accounts (see Schmidt  2006, Gamble 2006, Risse  2004) 
of British  euroscepticism  point  out the constitutional differences between the UK and 
the EU, as a  strong  factor in  the political unwillingness to integrate. In  the next 
chapter  we will  outline some of the differences in  the constitutional and institutional 
differences between  the EU and the UK, and more intensively,  how  these differences 
are articulated in  the British  discourses and in  their  relation  to questions of 
sovereignty.
GOVERNANCE
Issues of sovereignty, as articulated in  the British  EU-debate,  often  involves 
discussions of governance in relation  to the EU.  In  this chapter  we will  thus seek to 
look more into how  different conceptions of systems of governance have been 
discussed and put forth as arguments for (in)compatibility between UK and the EU.
To start off,  one can  beneficially  characterise the differences in  models of governance 
in Britain and in the EU. As Schmidt notes:
“The  EU is  a highly ‘compound’ polity characterised by a very high 
level of dispersion of governing activity through multiple 
authorities, with a quasi-federal division of powers vertically and 
horizontally, semi-pluralist policy formulation and regulatory 
implementation processes, and consensus-oriented, non-
majoritarian politics” (Schmidt, 2006: 19)
She argues that  the different  models of governance does not fit  well  with  the “more 
‘simple’  polities  like  Britain or France,  where  governing activity has  traditionally 
been more concentrated in a single authority through unitary states,  statist policy-
making and majoritarian politics” (Schmidt,  2006: 19). This corresponds somewhat 
to the argument  Risse (2004) makes about constitutional preferences - Germany  has 
an  easier  time ‘giving  up’ sovereignty  to the EU, as the constitutional buildup of the 
Union resembles the German federalist construction.
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This difference becomes important when Britain  interacts with  the EU in  relation  to 
adopting  rules and laws,  which have actually  been  quite easy,  for  Britain  as a  ‘simple’ 
polity,  to implement,  whereas projecting  their  institutional preferences on  to the EU 
and legitimising  such  is more difficult (Schmidt, 2006: 19).  As she argues:  “while 
national governance practices  have changed,  sometimes dramatically,  in the 
process of Europeanisation, national leaders  persist in speaking as  if the old ideas 
about democracy still applied, as if little has changed,  though everything has” (Ibid. 
26). The greater  problem  is that  the structure of political  discourse in  Britain  is not 
able to legitimise further  integration  as being democratic due to strong perceptions 
of in-compatibility  between  governance-systems (Ibid.  30-31). In  a  speech  in  1993, 
Thatcher  presents the federal/unitary  dichotomy  and as such an  aspect of this in-
compatibility:
“The  [Europeans Communities (Amendment)] Bill will pass 
considerable further powers  irrevocably from Westminster to 
Brussels, and, by extending majority voting, will undermine  our 
age-old parliamentary and legal institutions, both far older than 
those  in the  Community. We  have so much more  to lose by this 
Maastricht Treaty than any other state  in the  European 
Community. It will diminish democracy and increase 
bureaucracy” (Thatcher, 1993)
Reacting  to the increased integration  entailed in  the Maastricht  treaty,  Thatcher 
makes her  scepticism  with  the structure of the EEC clear  and portray  it as possibly 
undermining  the very  constitutional design of Britain’s parliament and institutions, 
as well  as noting  the consequential bureaucratic changes it will lead to in Britain.  For 
her, these two kinds of governance cannot co-exist, which  is illuminated in  the 
establishment  of an antagonistic relationship between  democracy  and bureaucracy. 
This relationship is given  meaning by  the creation  of a  chain  of equivalence between 
Britain as an  exceptional  model of democracy  opposite to the newer  bureaucratic 
network model  of Europe.  In  this way  a  contemporary  issue once agains follows the 
historical narrative/discourse of British  history  as exceptional and exogenous to that 
of continental  Europe and establishes a  conception  of the European  project  as 
something  undemocratic.  Within  this logic majority  voting  will necessarily  conflict 
with the British model.
David Cameron  also emphasises this difference in  governance between  EU and the 
UK, when  he in  2013  made points as to how  political and economic integration 
should affect countries:
“We  need a structure  that can accommodate  the  diversity of its 
members – North, South, East, West, large, small, old and new. 
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Some  of whom are  contemplating much closer economic and 
political integration. And many others, including Britain, who 
would never embrace  that goal [...] We  must not be  weighed down 
by an insistence  on a one  size  fits all approach which implies that 
all countries want the  same level of integration. The  fact is  that 
they don’t and we shouldn’t assert that they do” (Cameron, 2013)
Here Cameron  asserts that  different  ways of governing might  not  be compatible or 
open  for  change, thus inscribing  a  rather  static  notion  of such  systems. In 
comparison  to Thatcher,  However,  Cameron  does not  see this as an obstacle for 
cooperating  with  the EU, instead suggesting  a change where EU should be flexible 
concerning integration; taking  up the discussion  of a  possible multi-speed Europe in 
which  different  countries operate with  different degrees of integration.  A  model one 
might  argue already  functions with  the different  degrees of participation  in  the 
eurozone, schengen as well as other opt-outs. 
NETWORK AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE
Gamble (2006: 43) distinguishes between  network  and territorial governance in  this 
respect,  where network governance theory  explains the EU “as  a civil society rather 
than a state,  in which  citizens  interact freely  within a framework of common rules 
and institutions”  (Gamble, 2006: 43). Tony  Blair’s perceptions relate closely  to the 
concept of network governance, here in a speech from 2005:
“The  purpose of political Europe  should be  to promote the 
democratic and effective  institutions to develop policy in these  two 
spheres and across  the  board where  we  want and need to 
cooperate in our mutual interest”. (Blair 2005)
Blair  addresses a  set  of common  rules to regulate how  the countries of Europe work 
together  in  a  way  that  is beneficial  for  all  participants. Although Blair’s notion is 
more restricting  than  network governance,  since he is talking of what  he want the EU 
to be and not what it  is - it  is not  on all  policies that  he wish  to cooperate.  In 
dichotomic  relation  to this conception of network governance is a  conception of 
territorial governance,  where maintenance of unitary  sovereignty  within a  confined 
political territory  is emphasised as a  zero-sum  understanding  of the concept  (Gamble 
2006: 43).  This conception can be discerned from  the British  debate in the speech  by 
Gaitskell  (1962) already  emphasised, as well as other  proponents of a  maintenance of 
British unitary sovereignty, here exemplified in a late speech by Thatcher:
“The  [European] court draws upon the objective  of European 
integration to inform all its  rulings  by which over a period of time 
it has therefore  furthered decisions towards a unitary European 
state” (Thatcher, 1993). 
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Thatcher  presents the European court  as an  institution that  rules people to create a 
unitary  European  state,  and in  this way  centralizes power.  This point  is further 
emphasised: “It has  by its decisions  greatly extended the powers  of the centralized 
institutions against the nation state.” (ibid.)
What  is central in  these debates on  governance,  as well as in  the academic accounts 
on  the issue, is the central  dichotomy  between  a  discontinuation  of British  unitary 
sovereignty  - through  the ‘simple  polity’ - and a  more ‘compound polity’ accepting 
British  participation  in a  more centralised European  policy  network.  This dichotomy 
is clearly  related to what  we will discuss in  the next chapter,  namely  discussions of 
accession as either a ‘loss’ or ‘pooling’ of sovereignty.
ACCESSION AS A LOSS OR ‘POOLING’ OF SOVEREIGNTY
We will  now  look at  the discursive articulations within a  thematic conception of 
sovereignty.  What is central in  this respect  is two different  conceptions of what  EU 
membership entails for  British  sovereignty. To the British  politicians who were pro-
European,  this was a  key  problem; how  does one argue for  the ‘surrender’ of political 
and juridical sovereignty,  concerning domestic areas of polity,  and argue that it 
increases one's sovereign  relations.  Macmillan argued that the accession  to the 
Treaty  of Rome, and through  this acknowledgement  of the European  Community, 
would be beneficial as the political  influence one could exercise would be greater 
than if one was not part of the it;
“Accession to the Treaty of Rome  would not involve a one-sided 
surrender of ‘sovereignty’ on our part, but a pooling of sovereignty 
by all concerned, mainly in economic and social fields. In 
renouncing some of our own sovereignty we would receive in 
return a share  of the  sovereignty renounced by other 
members.” (Macmillan, 1962)
To Macmillan  the surrender  of sovereignty  is not  one of charity  but  of trade; to 
renounce some,  one must gain  some (Macmillan,  1961; 1962).  This would allow  the 
UK, according  to Macmillan,  to participate in the decision-making process at the 
highest  level  and thereby  ensuring  that the political  and economic  discourse of the 
UK could influence the rest of the, if created, Common Market:
“For Britain to stay out and isolate  herself from the mainstream of 
European strength would, I  believe, have  very damaging results 
both for ourselves and for the  whole  of the Commonwealth. There 
might be  no immediate  disaster, but we  could not hope  to go on 
exerting the same political influence” (Macmillan, 1962)
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This does however not  only  concern itself with  internal  European matters,  Macmillan 
argues that the ‘pooling  of sovereignty’ would also create a  barrier  strong enough  to 
compete with  the major  ‘power’ structures that  existed at  that  time; “A divided 
Europe would stand no  chance of competing with these great concentrations of 
power”  (Macmillan, 1962).  Grimond presents a  similar  understanding  of what  it 
would mean to the Commonwealth by arguing:
“If we  joined the Community we  could exercise a great influence. 
People  sometimes forget that in the consultations which precede 
decisions  in the Community a great Power is hardly ever in a 
minority. Instead of our national policies being frustrated, we 
should find that with some  adaptation, they would cover the 
policies of the  whole  of Western Europe  and be  more effective  than 
they are now” (Grimond, 1960)
Where Grimond argues that  the ‘giving  up’ of sovereignty  is a  sign  of progress in 
certain areas,  others must maintain  their  national disposition  (ibid.). Macmillan 
presents a  similar  line of reasoning by  arguing  that any  progression  into European 
cooperation must not come at  the expense of the Commonwealth  and the cooperative 
process within, as it is a source of stability within Europe;
“The  Commonwealth is a great source of stability and strength 
both to Western Europe  and to the  world as a whole, and I  am sure 
that its value  is  fully appreciated by the  member Governments of 
the European Economic Community.” (Macmillan, 1961)
LOSING SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH INTEGRATION
Grimond, Macmillan, and later  Wilson  (Schmidt, 2006: 28) respectively  agree  on, 
what  further  integration  means for  the Commonwealth and how  one must see 
‘pooling’ of sovereignty  as a  means to an end,  Hugh  Gaitskell  counter argues that  not 
only  are there no proven  economic advantages concerning the custom  barriers 
(Gaitskell,  1962),  there is also a  fundamental problem  with  the decision-making 
process, one which he argues has not yet been investigated;
“Well, I suppose you might say we would be  able  somehow or 
other to outvote  those  we disagree  with. I  would like  to be  very 
sure of that before I committed myself.” (Gaitskell, 1962)
The argumentation of Gaitskell,  relating  the independent  history  and future of the 
Commonwealth  to that  of the EEC, resembles what Schmidt  argues is a  normative 
British argumentation;
“Whereas French notions of political rights are  justified 
philosophically, by reference to  the  universal rights  of man as 
declared at the  time  of the  French revolution, the  British notion of 
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political rights as  embodied in parliamentary sovereignty is 
justified by reference to history and the  traditional liberties of 
Englishmen” (Schmidt, 2006: 28)
Gaitskell  can  be seen  as arguing  this way, by  looking  as his argumentation 
concerning governance, namely  one of British  supremacy  that does not,  necessarily, 
exclude European  cooperation, and/or integration, but must not  counter  the 
interests of the Commonwealth.  This can  be discerned through  his reference to the 
system  built  upon  the historic traditions in  the UK (Gaitskell, 1962). This form  of 
argumentation  can  furthermore be linked to Thatcher  and the discourse she 
represented at the debate concerning  the Maastricht  Treaty  both in  terms of 
endorsing  individual nations’ initiative and the ensurement of national  sovereignty 
as a  point  of origin  for  the cooperative process in  Europe (Thatcher,  1988; 1993). 
Gaitskell  was concerned with  how  the majority-vote system  would be exploited and 
Thatcher  continues this critique in  her  reflection  upon  the Maastricht  and the course, 
in  which,  it had come to be (Ibid.). It  is however  a  critique meant to support her main 
point, namely the system it had passed; 
“The  Maastricht Treaty extends  the  powers of the  Commission 
from 11 to 20 areas  of government and provides for 111 new 
occasions when decisions can be by qualified majority. This is a 
massive extension. In our case, it will be only about 100 occasions 
unless  we were  to go into  the single  currency, which I hope we 
never do. Some  of those  majority occasions include  decisions  in 
economic and monetary policy. This  is an overwhelming 
centralisation of decisions by bureaucracy at the expense  of 
democracy and at the  expense  of accountability to the 
electorate.” (Thatcher, 1993)
Thatcher  saw  the ‘shifting’ of power  to Brussels from  the national states as a  “relic” 
from  the communist countries and argued national sovereignty  is a  strength,  not a 
blockade;
“We  have  not successfully rolled back the  frontiers of the  state  in 
Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a 
European super-state  exercising a new dominance  from Brussels. 
Certainly we  want to see  Europe  more  united and with a greater 
sense of common purpose. But it must be in a way which preserves 
the  different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense  of 
national pride in one’s own country” (Thatcher, 1988)
The diversity  of governance systems, identities and traditions tied to each  country, 
and the importance of maintaining their  existence is an  important  point  for 
Thatcher,  one which  manifests itself both  in  a  historic  sense, the historic  tradition(s) 
as a  building  stone for  progress,  and a  continuous condition, in  which  national 
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sovereignty  remains in  the hands of the national decision-making  process (Thatcher, 
1988; 1993).
John  Major, former PM2, shared Thatchers disdain  for  majority-voting  on  defence 
and economic matters for  the UK (Smith,  2012: 1283; Major,  1991).  Both  Thatcher 
and Major  saw  European  cooperation as a  contingent  relationship,  one which was 
not based upon  forced action  from  the start, but  voluntary  action  when beneficial; a 
re-negotiable quid pro quo  relationship. Major  handled the opt-outs for  the UK in 
the Maastricht  Treaty  process on  exactly  this basis,  that the UK should not be  forced 
to act  in  a non-beneficial  way  when  the system  could be designed to accommodate 
the UK’s wishes (Major,  1991).  To Major,  the continuation  of keeping  matters of 
sovereign  power  on national terms was important for  the will  of the nation-states to 
cooperate fully, one which  he personally  saw  inevitable if the UK was to adopt the 
Maastricht Treaty:
“There  was  pressure  from other member states to take  foreign 
policy decisions by majority voting. I  was not prepared to agree 
that Britain could be  outvoted on any substantive issue  of foreign 
policy. Some of our partners also sought to draw a distinction 
between decisions  of principle, where  unanimity would apply, and 
implementing decisions which could be  subject to majority voting 
[...] But we cannot be forced to subject our foreign policy to the  will 
of other member states. We  have, in fact, preserved unanimity for 
all decisions where we decide that we need it.”  (Major, 1991)
Major  argued that  to ‘give’ up, or  ‘pool’,  sovereignty  on  such  structures and matters 
would be to acknowledge that  European  cooperation  had a legitimate course of 
action to overrule  nationally  constituted politics and decisions (Major, 1991). 
Thatcher  presents a  similar  logic when describing  the attributes which the 
Maastricht  Treaty  grants to the European  Union,  attributes that she considers as 
equal to the powers of a state and thus entailing elements of sovereignty:
“The  Maastricht Treaty gives this new European Union all the 
attributes of a sovereign state. First, there  is  citizenship. It gives 
the  right to conduct foreign policy and assert its  identity on the 
international scene  (the  whole of this treaty has that); and the 
right to frame a common defence  policy which in time could lead 
to common defence  (the  treaty has that). It has its own Supreme 
Court of Justice, the  guardian of its constitution. It has its own 
external boundaries. It manages its own economic and monetary 
policy. It will have  its own central bank, ultimately including a 
single  currency, [...] It has a single  market. It conducts its 
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international trade  negotiations  as a unit. We have no authority to 
conduct trade negotiations.” (Thatcher, 1993)
To Thatcher  this entailed that  European cooperation would no longer  be a  process 
between  the nations who were part  of the community,  instead it would become a 
matter  between  a  nation-state and a “European super-state” (Ibid.).  This 
constitutional  European  state,  Thatcher  argues, undermines the contingent 
relationship she advocates for,  with  a  basis in strong  sovereign nation-states, in  it’s 
very  existence, made possible  by  the ‘pooling’ of sovereignty.  This ‘pooling’ threatens 
the historically founded and constitutional sovereignty of the British nation:
“The  Bill will pass considerable  further powers irrevocably from 
Westminster to Brussels, and, by extending majority voting, will 
undermine our age-old parliamentary and legal institutions, both 
far older than those  in the  Community. We have  so much more to 
lose  by this Maastricht Treaty than any other state  in the 
European Community. It will diminish democracy and increase 
bureaucracy” (Thatcher, 1993)
Thatcher  furthermore underlines the increased integrationist  measures within  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  as “undermining democracy” (ibid.),  emphasising the institutional 
measures within the treaty  as being  distinctly  different and antagonistic  to what  she 
conceives of as British  democracy. The increase in  complex  political  institutions and 
bureaucratic measures of increased integration is put in  direct  opposition to what is 
deemed British  history  and legal institutions of democracy,  unlike other  states within 
the region which  do not  stand to lose their  inherent  institutional traditions 
(Thatcher, 1988; 1993).
John  Major  argued that  the opt-outs were to be acquired in  order  to safeguard the 
possibility  of overruling of any  legislation that  would conflict  with  British core 
interests (Major,  1991), in  essence to avoid what  Thatcher thought  to be around the 
corner.
The argumentation, both  for and against,  bears a  striking resemblance to one 
another,  owing  to its contingent  nature; where the pro-side argues that  it is an  entry-
ticket one earns back once paid, those against  argue that once it is paid,  you  won’t  see 
it  again; it  will be a  part  of the constitution  of a  new  state. It  should be argued that 
the pro-side sees the cooperation  as a  form  of equal partnership with  future 
economic  benefits, whereas the opposite view  this only  in its relation to its emphasis 
on  national sovereignty  and thus utilise the possibility  of opt-outs in  the Maastricht 
Treaty to secure their conception of national identity.
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Certain forms of zero-sum  perceptions can be derived from  the argumentation 
presented in  this chapter, in  particular  concerning  constitutional  conceptions of the 
state. Thatcher  presents a  symbolic  premonition  of Europe as a  strong  cooperation 
between  nation-states,  in an  inter-governmentalist  view, retaining  their  respective 
sovereignty,  wherein  a  contingent  relationship can  be established between  national 
identity  and political integration. Opposite to this the conception  of a  bureaucratic 
structure where sovereignty  is maintained at  the top in  a  European  constituted state 
vis-a-vis  a  federal conception  of Europe exists. One which  Wæver  argues is not 
understandable to Britons;
“This  seems incomprehensible  to Danes and probably to the 
British, who think more in zero-sum terms: what is given to 
Brussels is lost to Copenhagen or London – what is won back to 
the  nation is  taken away from a federalising Europe”  (Wæver, 
2005: 44)
The above can be argued as inherent for Thatcher,  as for  her, sovereignty  is either 
retained by  the nation-state or  it is bereft  of it,  completely.  Major  shares this zero-
sum  perception and promoted it  to argue for  the opt-outs, secured by  his office. This 
form  of static zero-sum  understanding  of sovereignty  stands in  contrast  to the more 
functional and complementary  understanding as presented by  Macmillan and 
Grimond in  particular. They  rather  see sovereignty  as a  fluid construction, one which 
can  be used to cooperate on the structuring  of a  cooperation  that  in  turn  could 
become a power-structure which external markets and power-blocks cannot ignore.
POLITICAL ECONOMIC ISSUES
In  the British  debate  on  accession  to the European  community,  one of the most 
prominent  debates is that of economic rationalisation  and -prosperity. Opposed to 
those discourses presented on  the continent  for  the future and form  of the EU, the 
British  discourse is heavily  focused on  the economic benefits of joining  the economic 
Community.  This debate circles around a  distinction  between  British  integration as a 
means to an end or an end in itself.
BRITAIN AND THE SINGLE MARKET
David Cameron  brings forth  the notion  of economics as the  central  issue of European 
cooperation,  arguing  that  “At the core of the European Union must be,  as it is  now, 
the single market.”  (Cameron, 2013). The logic of European cooperation  as a  means 
for  economic  progress also became central in  the discussions of the british  budget 
rebate in  the early  80’s by  Thatchers demands of Britain’s right  to get  “her own 
money back” (Thatcher in Bache et al. 2011: 146).
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From  the earliest  discussions of British  accession  the economic costs and benefits of 
partaking in  the Common Market has been  a  central focal  point; more than  anything 
focusing on  the economically  instrumental means to further  British  economic 
development:
“Surely it is  desirable  that Britain and her Commonwealth should 
share in this  European development. […] If we  in the 
Commonwealth are  not closely associated with this area of rapid 
growth, in the  long run the  whole  Commonwealth can only be  the 
loser.” (Grimond 1960)
An economic argument based on  rationalist  arguments of costs and benefits to 
British  growth  is presented widely  in  discourses on UK-European  relations. It  is 
applied heavily  as an  argument for accession  that entry  into the Common  Market will 
lead to increased growth and economic prosperity in the UK.
“It is common knowledge that our prosperity as a nation, and 
indeed our very existence, depends on exporting our goods abroad. 
The  countries of the  European Community, with their rapidly 
expanding economies, would provide  us with that market. This is 
one of the  strongest arguments for going in and competing on level 
terms.” (Macmillan 1962)
MacMillan  here presents us with  the equivalence between British  economic progress 
and accession to the Common  Market - making  it  a  rational,  rather  than ideological 
decision, based on  economic rationalisation  rather  than  ideals about  European 
Integration as an end in itself. 
RATIONALISATION OF GOVERNANCE - COOPERATING ON CROSS-BORDER ISSUES
Besides a ‘rationalisation’ discourse of economic  development, the British discourse 
of European  Integration  also entails a  discourse of governance rationalisation, 
legitimising  integration by  noting the EU’s increased relative capacity  to deliver 
goods,  services and economic stability  and prosperity  vis-a-vis  nation-states 
(Gamble,  2006: 43). As Macmillan  notes in  his speech  to Parliament in 1962,  the 
decision  to join  the EU involves some measure of political  integration  and unity, 
underpinning the creation of a more coherent polity:
“It is true, of course, that political unity is the  central aim of these 
European countries and we would naturally accept that ultimate 
goal.” (Macmillan 1962)
But  for  Macmillan, the question  pertains not  to specific issues of governance systems 
or  increased political integration  leading  to any  loss of sovereignty,  but  rather  its 
efficiency  to handle regional  issues and problems of,  but for  MacMillan  not 
exclusively, economic nature:
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“Surely the  right question to ask ourselves is this: has the 
Community the  necessary and appropriate  means for dealing with 
the  problems of its  members, whether they arise  out of these 
present negotiations in which we have  taken part or whether they 
arise  from any other cause  in the  life  of the  Community? That 
surely is  the  question one has to put about a living, changing, 
developing organisation such as  the Community. […] The  answer 
to that question is undeniably – yes, it has got those  means and, 
what is more  they have  been and are  being used successfully. […] 
through the Treaty, through the  Commission, through the Council 
of Ministers these matters  are  being handled the  whole 
time.” (Ibid.)
The discourse of rationalisation  of economy  and governance through integration  is of 
a  quite different  nature than  both discourses of integration  as pertaining  to issues of 
sovereignty,  but rather  it  has,  as a  central  nodal point, issues of rationality  and cost-
benefits of increased integration. Increased integration  is seen  rather  as an 
instrumental measure to aid in  development  of national political and economical 
projects,  rather than  as an end in  itself - a point  which  can  also be seen  in  strong 
arguments for  increased intergovernmental cooperation  based on  unitary  nation-
states rather  than political  and cultural  uniformity  imposed by  a  “European super-
state” (Thatcher 1988).
Another construction  of Europe pertains to ideas of co-authorship and a 
strengthening of political ties with  a  region  that  already  share the same cultural  and 
societal  values as the UK. Furthermore it is based on  more than  trade and economic 
instrumentalism  (although  it still  occupies a  central  nodal point in  the construction 
of UK-EU relations), but also political and societal integration:
“This  is  a union of values, of solidarity between nations and 
people, of not just a common market in which we trade but a 
common political space in which we live as citizens.” (Blair 2005)
This construction  of Europe has two main  pillars at  the basis of its argument; a socio-
economic  and political  project  (EU as an  end) outlined by  the above quote, and an 
argument of co-authorship of economic integration  (EU as a  means),  focusing  on  the 
possibilities of European  economic reform  - so as to disseminate British economic 
power  and preferences across Europe, through  its exercise of political  power  within 
the Community (Grimond 1960).
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MAPPING OUT THE INNER LOGICS OF THE BRITISH EU DEBATE
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Mapping  out  the inner  logics and structures of British  EU discourse we find 
inspiration  in  Wæver’s (2005)  conception of discursive constructions of the state and 
the EU as layered.  A  graphic  display  of our  findings are presented in  figure 1.  What 
we find is a complex  picture of different conceptions of (UK in) Europe in  connection 
to ‘inner’ logics of UK-EU relations and on  the deepest level a  national conception  of 
the UK itself,  pictured in  the bottom  of the figure. It  thus,  intentionally, diverts the 
attention  from  party  differences and instead seeks to map out  some of the logics that 
have pertained over  time and thus structures discourses across party  lines. The figure 
furthermore seeks to explain  the relationship between  different  constraining and 
enabling logics of discourse,  more or  less sedimented,  seen  in  the vertical division of 
‘layers of discourse’.
THE INNER LOGICS OF BRITISH POLITICAL IDENTITIES
At the lowest level,  innermost  level of the discursive structure, we find a  common 
construction  of the UK based on  the country’s exceptional history  as a  European 
state: its relation  to continental  Europe is articulated as a saviour  of the continent 
and a victor of WWII,  rather  than  as in  a ‘need’3 of reconstruction  and rearticulation 
of national political  identities - as in  Germany  (and to a  certain  degree France - in 
reconciliation with  Germany; see Wæver  2005). The British  development  of political 
institutions is most often  conceived of as unitary  and linear  and as Schmidt  (2006) 
argues, it is “embodied in”  the democratic  institutions of the UK through  symbols 
such  as ‘Parliamentary  Sovereignty’.  This entails a  logic  that  any  division  or  sharing 
of authority  with  other  systems of governance will  have to be  articulated as 
undemocratic, as the British  democratic  foundation  is based on  its unitariness. 
Furthermore the UK is articulated as having a  strong  global outlook; either  opposing 
regional  protectionism  or invoking the argument  of European  integration  as a  means 
to establish and maintain its global role. 
CONCEPTIONS OF EU-UK RELATIONS
At the middle level  of the figure we present  four  different  conceptions of the 
relationship between UK and EU,  all of them  based on  the national construction  in 
the lower  level of the figure,  but  with quite different outcomes in the upper  level of 
the figure. The middle level should thus illustrate the political articulations of the 
inner  logics in relation  to British  European  foreign policy,  and presents four  different 
55
3  This ‘need’ of rearticulation should be seen in the light of a discourse theoretical perspective on post-war Europe, where 
political and economic circumstances throughout the region entailed a dislocation of the discursive field of political 
identities, leading to a discursive need of rearticulation and reconstruction of these. This, in theoretical terms, becomes a 
need as the prevailing discourses are no longer legitimate and able to explain social interaction. A common example is the 
breakdown of the discursive hierarchy within Apartheid that entailed a crucial need of a ‘legitimate’ re-articulation of the 
social structures. For further elaboration on the topic of dislocation see Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2000; 
Howarth 2000b). 
political interpretations of the lower  level. These are divided into boxes as that  makes 
it  easier  to identify  their  relation  to the construction  of antagonisms and their  effect 
on  the discourse  as more or  less eurosceptic.  The upper  level illustrates the British 
conceptions of the EU, both  as how  it  should be and how  it  is perceived. These are 
divided into a  binary  hierarchy  of a  we/them  antagonism  as conceived in  Hooghe & 
Marks’ distinction  between  exclusive and inclusive identities.  In  between  we have 
made room  for  discursive articulations that seek to mediate between these 
antagonisms,  exemplified by  quid pro  quo articulations of UK-EU relations with 
strong instrumentalist arguments.
We locate the British  articulations of their  relationship to the EU on  a continuum 
between  pro and anti-conceptions.  One of the logics that  have endured over time has 
been  articulation  of the British relationship to other  European Countries during  the 
second world war,  which can beneficially  be characterised as a  nodal  point.  This 
relationship between  the UK and  the rest  of the European countries was articulated 
as being  separated from  and exceptional to that  of continental Europe. That was e.g. 
seen in  Churchills articulation  of the UK as sponsors of European development 
sedimenting  the logic of the EU as first and foremost  a  continental European project. 
This logic also manifested itself in  articulations of the chain  of equivalence that  EU is 
an  end to British  history  thus constructing a  binary  hierarchy  within  which  the 
national culture of Britain  could only  be sustained by  maintaining unitary  political 
sovereignty  - vested in  the parliament. This logic  constraints and enables the 
discursive possibilities in  the upper  level of the figure. The articulation  of European 
membership thus becomes a  discontinuation  of British  political  institutional history 
and creates the possibility  of legitimately  articulating  the EU as a  federalist 
‘superstate’ infringing  on  nation-state authority.  As well,  constructions of a  complex 
EU governance system  are portrayed as undermining  the simple (in  Schmidt’s 
account) political authority  of the UK; its democratic foundation. Thus, the 
conception  of the EU ends up undermining  simple democratic  ideals within  this 
discursive structure.
BINARY OPPOSITIONS
In  opposition  to the articulations identified as they constructions,  conceiving  of EU 
as an  entity  inherently  separated from  the UK we find what  we label  we  conceptions 
of EU. These articulations can  beneficially  be related to what Risse deems nested or 
marble cake identities in  the sense that  a  logic is constructed through  a chain  of 
equivalence between  membership of the EU and safeguarding  of national culture and 
particularity.  Thus, this construction of EU-UK relations does not negate 
membership nor  the possibility  of maintaining the lowest level  of the discursive 
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structure, as the interpretation of the structure in  the second level creates a  logic  of 
complementarity  rather  than one of unitary  as laid out above. This can be seen  in 
rejections of WWII as a  defining nodal  point  for  the British  political identity.  On the 
contrary, this is regarded as an  outdated debate on European  Integration, as the 
main focal point  of this interpretation is concerned with  economic and political 
‘realities’ as the legitimate contemporary reasons for integration. 
COMBINING OPPOSITIONAL LOGICS
We find articulations, however, that  are difficult  to place within  the binary  hierarchy 
established in  the we and they  categories.  Such articulations are better  characterised 
as attempts to re-articulate the divide or what  discourse theory  deems as attempts to 
suture a dislocated field of discursive elements (Howarth  & Stavrakakis 2000: 14). 
This articulation  of an  EU, which  can best  be summarised by  the popular  idea of a 
wider  and looser  Europe, based on  states before the EU as well as a  sense of quid pro 
quo attitude towards European  Integration. This has strong connotations to 
arguments of economic and political rationalisation, despite democratic issues raised 
by  further  integration.  As a  consequence of this interpretation  of national interest 
and -identity,  the conception of the EU is constrained by  the discursive focus of 
furthering  national  interest  within  the EU and the EU is constructed rather as a 
means than  a  political and economic  end in  itself. This construction  of the EU is 
discerned through arguments of re-negotiation  of treaties,  and increased focus on 
opt-outs,  suggestions for a  more flexible EU, and intergovernmental cooperation 
rather  than  an  increase in  ‘federalist’ institutions.  An interesting  point  arises from 
this presentation  of the discursive structures; it becomes apparent  that  this 
conception  of the EU not  only  stems from  the quid pro quo  interpretation  of British 
political identity, but that it  can  also be seen  as a  reaction  from  the unitary 
conception  of the political  identity.  As such, this ‘middle-ground’ of British  EU-
debate can be seen as formed by  both  a  structure based on  economic rationalisation 
as well as a  connection  to more eurosceptic and anti-federalist  conceptions with  a 
strong basis in  the unitary  ‘camp’. Furthermore,  it  seeks to combine an acceptance of 
complementary  sovereignty  together with  the scepticism  towards the abolishment of 
national political differences.
We will  now  turn towards an  investigation  of how  these logics and structures 
constrain and enable the political possibilities of the contemporary political debate. 
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HISTORICALLY ESTABLISHED LOGICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATE?
In  this diachronic part  of the analysis,  we will  apply  the discursive structures laid out 
above to the contemporary  debate on UK-EU relations, and describe how  the 
structures both  enable and constrain  the possible discursive articulations of British 
membership as well as how  these structures are challenged by  new  political 
articulations.
The recent Eurozone crisis has prompted an  increase in British  articulations 
concerning a  possible withdrawal from  the EU. This chapter  will  present  the 
articulations concerning the legitimacy  of the EU and what  conceptions are being 
established currently  in  the British  political spectrum, ranging  from  Conservative 
over Labour and Liberal Democrats to Ukip - United Kingdom Independence Party.
CONSERVATIVES
DECENTRALISED DEMOCRACY
Cameron  argues that the respective populations feel that  the EU is no longer  an 
entity  working  on  their  behalf, but rather  a  structure no longer  heading in  the 
direction,  to which  it  was intended.  John  Baron 4,  MP,  though  not  a  prolific  figure 
offered insight in  2011  that symbolically  encapsulates some of the EU-sceptic Tories’ 
conceptions;
“The  key point is that what this country joined was, in essence, a 
free  trade area, and that since  that time  we have  seen the 
continual salami-slicing of our sovereignty and the  British people 
have still not yet been consulted on that change” (Baron, 2011: 48)
What  Baron here contends with Cameron  on, is that  the legitimacy  of national 
sovereignty  is removed when  given to the Union, as the structure is no longer  found 
to be democratically  legitimate by  the nation-states and their  respective populations. 
Cameron,  against  a  referendum  in 2011, changes his position  and in  2013  he argues, 
similar  to Baron, in  an  exclusive manner, that  legal judgements made by  the EU is 
affecting  the life of the British  people without  their national parliamentary  system 
being a part of the decision-making process:
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4  Backbench for the Conservative. A vocal supporter for a more EU-critical discourse for the Tory’s. In June of 2012, he handed David 
Cameron a letter, allegedly signed by almost 100 MP’s demanding Cameron prepare legislation committing the UK to a EU-referendum. 
He argued that “ [...] there is a consistent majority in this country who believe that the European Union meddles too much in our 
everyday lives”  (Baron cited in BBC, 2012).  Furthermore in May of 2013, Baron was part of the 130 MP’s who expressed discontent with 
the ‘Queens Speech’ and that it did not include plans for a referendum in 2014 (BBC, 2013). 
“people also feel that the EU is now heading for a level of political 
integration that is far outside  Britain’s  comfort zone.”  (Cameron, 
2013)
Cameron  offers the example of British  doctors having  their  working  hours set  in 
Brussels as an  example of how  the British  are losing  their belief in  the Union  as it 
supersedes the sovereignty  of the national parliament, where these policies should be 
addressed (Cameron, 2013). Cameron presents this as part of his fourth principle5;
“My fourth principle  is democratic accountability: We  need to 
have  a bigger and more significant role  for national parliaments. 
[...] It is national parliaments, which are, and will remain, the true 
source  of real democratic legitimacy and accountability in the  EU. 
(Cameron, 2013)
Cameron  argues that,  to some extent,  this discontent for  the EU can  be ascribed to 
the lack of referendums previously  in  the Union’s history, referring to the previous 
notion of the EU as intrusive (Cameron,  2013). Baron  agreed with  Cameron on this 
and elaborated:
“The  political elites  across Europe—not just here—should 
understand the  growing frustration with the  current situation. We 
joined what was essentially a free  trade  area; it has  turned more 
and more  into political union. People  do not like  that. They want to 
be  consulted, but they will be denied that freedom of choice  if 
Members in this Chamber defeat the  motion this evening. That, in 
my view, has to be wrong. (Baron, 2011: 107)
What  both  Baron and Cameron  attempts to establish  is a  binary  hierarchy,  consisting 
of the zero-sum  understanding  of legitimacy, where it  can  be obtained by  pushing  for 
a  more decentralised union, which  will return  the decision-making  to the national 
structures, or it  can disappear  in  the bureaucracy  currently  established. The zero-
sum is established through this as:
Decentralised decision-making 6 =  Democratic legitimacy
Bureaucratic centralisation   =  Intrusion < - > lack of legitimacy
Cameron’s proposal to obtain  this legitimacy  arises from  his main  problem  with  the 
union, namely  its centralised bureaucracy.  What Cameron instead proposes is a  new 
starting point:
“We  in a flexible  union of free  member states who share  treaties 
and institutions and pursue together the  ideal of co-operation. [...] 
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5 Cameron presents five principles as the basis for future EU cooperation for Britain (Cameron, 2013)  
6 With referendums.
To advance  our shared interests by using our collective  power to 
open markets. And to build a strong economic base  across the 
whole of Europe.” (Cameron, 2013: 10)
This is not  a  symbol of Macmillan’s ‘pooling’ of sovereignty  but rather  Thatchers, 
namely,  the  idea that sovereign  member states will  cooperate without  having  to ‘pool’ 
their  sovereignty  but  rather  their  collective power  will  flow  through  the legislation/
proposal set forth.
PROPOSING A NEW GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR THE EU
Cameron  proposes that  this new  governance conception of the EU should be seen 
through the following assertion;
“Let’s start from this proposition: We are  a family of democratic 
nations, all members of one European Union, whose  essential 
foundation is the  single market rather than the  single 
currency.” (Cameron, 2013: 9)
Here a  we-construction  is being  established, one which  is inclusive based on  specific 
terms, one of the EU as being  defined by  its respective member-states. The 
conception  of EU established here as a  we is one of cooperation  pertaining to the 
single market  as the primary,  and initial,  focus. Cameron proposes that  this 
governance structure and cooperation  remains flexible and that the level of 
integration wanted, is to be defined by the respective nation-states;
“We  must not be  weighed down by an insistence  on a one  size  fits 
all approach which implies that all countries want the  same  level 
of integration. The  fact is  that they don’t and we shouldn’t assert 
that they do.” (Cameron, 2013: 8)
What  is needed is a  ‘rolling-back’ of the state-apparatus within  the EU, a  logic shared 
with  Thatcher  as presented in  the previous chapter, which  secures an 
intergovernmental  cooperation  based on a  loose and flexible structure,  capable of 
respecting  national preferences.  This particular  argumentation  stems from  Cameron, 
Major  and Thatcher  in  their  view  on the consequences for  the unitary  development in 
the UK,  and their  respective  articulations of letting  the UK be the UK,  integration or 
not (Thatcher,  1988; 1993; Major, 1991; 2013; Cameron; 2013).  Cameron should be 
seen in  the same light  as Thatcher  and Major  was in  the previous chapter,  namely 
that  their  zero-sum  definition(s)  of sovereignty  and legitimacy  entails an  argument 
for decentralising the decision-making process to ensure legitimacy and progress7.
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7 This was initially established in the conclusion of the previous chapter in relation to figure 1. 
THE EU AS A MEANS TO AN END
Cameron  argues that  the Union is not  an  end but a  means (2013).  So to say, Cameron 
does not disagree with  the existence of a  union, but rather with  a  conception  of the 
union  as a  political  end in  itself (Cameron,  2013).  The purpose of the EU as an 
establishment  within  the we concept  for  the Conservative8  pertains to the single 
market,  which  is and must  be the primary  focus, according  to Cameron, for  the union 
to maintain  its existence.  Cameron argues for  Britains continuous support for 
European  cooperation  if the structure of the union is changed; it must  return  its 
shares of sovereignty  to the respective member-states and allow  them  to decide for 
themselves their  involvement  and level of integration, ensuring democratic 
legitimacy  (Cameron, 2013). When  arguing for  this,  Cameron articulates the same 
identity  for  British  politics that  Thatcher  and Gaitskell  did, which, as described in  the 
previous conclusion, constrains the possible discursive construction  of EU 
membership. Cameron  follows both  Thatcher  and Gaitskell  within  this logic, 
understood through  the critique that  all  three deliver on the illegitimate cooperative 
nature of the EU, that  seeks to centralise power,  removing  legitimacy  from  the very 
project and the parliamentary  system  in the nation-states. Cameron argues for the 
same understanding  of static sovereignty  or power as Thatcher, namely  that  it  cannot 
exist belonging to the union and the nation-state, it must remain in one place.
To elaborate on this Cameron argues that,  with  power returning, a flexible system 
can  be established wherein  the individual  nation-states return to an inter-
governmental cooperation  surrounding  the single market,  where any  notion  of a 
state-apparatus  is understood as national.  This stand in  opposition  to a  political 
project,  where the EU is to become a  federal project. Major  agrees with  Cameron on 
this and elaborates:
“We  don’t know  where  ‘more  Europe’  will end. Or how we can stop 
an ever increasing bureaucratic power grab into what Douglas 
Hurd [Former Minister of State] memorably called ‘the  nooks  and 
crannies of our national life’. People fear: will we  eventually be 
submerged in an undemocratic United States of Europe? For most 
of us, that is simply unacceptable” (Major, 2013)
We then  return  to the notion  presented in  the previous chapter  of understanding the 
British  politics as unitary  which  in  essence can  be ascribed as the reason for these 
political actors disdain  for  a  federal  project, prompting  both  Cameron  and Major  to 
call  for  a  re-negotiation  of the treaties,  whose end goal is unclear  and followingly 
represents a ‘covered up’ move for a federal union (Cameron, 2013; Major, 2013).
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8 It should here be pointed out that a generalising statement such as this pertains to the Tor(y)(ies) present day in agreement 
with Cameron. The current fragmentation is not taken into account. 
LIBERAL DEMOCRATS
In  the Liberal Democrats manifesto from  2010,  they  write “Liberal Democrats 
believe that European cooperation is the best way for Britain to be strong,  safe and 
influential in the future” (Liberal Democrats,  2010:66). This clearly  point to a  strong 
global outlook for  UK that is also very  inclusive, since cooperation  with  Europe will 
benefit  UK.  This outlook is further  emphasised by  the idea  that a  strong  commitment 
to EU will  increase Britains influence (Liberal  Democrats, 2010: 66).  The leader  of 
the Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg,  presents an  idea  of UK as being exceptional in  the 
EU when he says:
“We  were among the  single  market’s architects: Lord Cockfield – a 
British Commissioner – helped design it; Margaret Thatcher 
played a critical role  in pushing it through. And today – as the 
most open, liberal economy in the EU – we will need to help finish 
what was started twenty years ago.” (Clegg, 2012)
He presents not  just  the historical  importance of the role of the UK in EU, as Britons 
were crucial  in  making  the single market,  but  also as being  leaders in  the current  EU; 
keeping  the single market  functioning.  They  advocate that  EU should work as 
network governance by stating:
“Working together, the  member states of the  EU have a better 
chance of managing the  impacts of globalisation, such as cross-
border crime and environmental pollution”  (Liberal Democrats, 
2010: 66)
When the EU member  states work together  it  also means that this increased 
integration will lead to increased influence; The conception  of EU for  the Liberal 
Democrats is that  of interdependence between EU states,  which  is an  idea  similar  to 
what  Blair  presented in  2005. They  do, however,  present  some notions of a  ‘state 
before UK’ relation  in  their  manifesto when  they  write that UK should join  the euro 
when  the economic situation  is right, and that  the euro should only  be implemented 
if a  majority  of Britons vote for it in  a referendum  (Liberal Democrats, 2010: 67). 
But, however,  arguing for implementing the euro in  the UK is still  an  expression  of 
further integration into the EU.
MOVING AGAINST A MULTI-SPEED EUROPE
Nick  Clegg mentions the eurozone countries in  his speech  from  November  2012; he 
mentions them  as the inner  core of the EU integrating  further because of their  single 
currency.  There is a   ring  around the core that  is the “inner circle: the  states  who 
aren’t in the euro, but are members  of the  EU” (Clegg,  2012). The outer  circle is the 
countries outside of the EU: Norway, Switzerland, accession  countries and so on. 
According to Clegg
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“The  UK is  in the  inner circle  – but the  terrain is  shifting. The core 
is tightening – to  what degree  we don’t yet know. Some  states on 
the  outside are seeking, over time, to head further in.” (Clegg, 
2012).
For  Clegg  this means that the UK has to choose how  much  integration  they  want,  and 
how  much  influence they  want,  although  he differs slightly  from  the Liberal 
Democrat manifesto as he at that particular  time did not  think it  was the right  idea 
for  the UK to join  the euro. Clegg illustrates the possibility  for  UK to include itself in 
core deliberations within the EU:
“That [remaining in the  inner circle] will require an approach that 
is engaged and balanced. So not accepting every request or 
regulation sent from Brussels. But, equally, cooperating 
constructively where it is in our national interest to do so.”  (Clegg, 
2012; see also Clegg 2009)
He argues that  to keep the current  level of integration  UK has to occasionally  put the 
state before the EU when  it is in  the national interest, which  is a  different standpoint 
than  in  the 2010  manifesto, where full  integration into the EU were the goal,  and 
leans to a looser idea of integration.
LEAVING THE UNION AS LOSING SOVEREIGNTY
Clegg  criticised the proposition that  UK should be able to choose their  own  opt-outs 
and the laws that are favourable for the UK, saying:
“It is wishful thinking to suggest we  could –  effectively –  give 
ourselves a free  pass to undercut the  Single  market... only to then 
renegotiate  our way back in to the  laws that suit us. The  rest of 
Europe  simply wouldn’t have  it. What kind of club gives you a full 
pass, with all the perks, but doesn’t expect you to pay the  full 
membership fee or abide by all the rules?” (Clegg, 2012)
This is to some extent  a  critique of the kind of intergovernmental  policy  that 
Cameron  talks about but Thatcher  also mentions, where flexibility  should be possible 
for  EU member  states,  for them  to choose the policies they  find favourable for  their 
own  countries.  Thus this argument  emphasises the Liberal Democrats stand 
supporting  network  governance and inter-dependence between EU member  states 
since Clegg  criticised proposition  would create conflict within  Europe.This argument 
is further  emphasised through  the use of metaphor  of EU as a  club, where you  have 
to follow  the rules to obtain  the perks. Though  Clegg  himself propose an idea  quite 
similar  to that  of Cameron  and Thatcher,  when  he says that  the UK should be 
“...cooperating with our neighbours  when it is  for the good of the British 
people” (Clegg, 2012). He presents somewhat  of the same idea  but  he uses a  more 
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open  rhetoric  that  would give national  gains through  co-authorship in the EU rather 
than through intergovernmental governance.
This co-authorship in the EU will then, according  to Clegg,  give the UK a  better 
global influence and overall strengthen the UK:
“The  best – and most realistic – choice  for the United Kingdom is 
to stand tall in our European hinterland; for the  sake of our 
security, our prosperity and our place in the world” (Clegg, 2012)
If the UK leave the EU it  would mean “a catastrophic  loss  of sovereignty for this 
nation. I want better for the UK” (Clegg,  2012). Since members of the EU gain  global 
influence,  and influence within the EU, leaving  would mean  that the UK would lose 
leverage with  the USA, since this relationship between  the UK and the USA  based on 
UK’s position in the EU.
The Liberal Democrats’ see the UK as having a  global outlook, because of their  focus 
on  UK’s ability  to have influence on a  global level,  both  in the EU but  also outside of 
the EU. Furthermore Clegg  present  an  idea  of the UK as being exceptional  and 
instrumental in  creating  of the single market, and thereby  emphasise the importance 
of the UK in  the EU.  Furthermore the EU is presented as network governance in the 
Liberal Democrats’ manifesto, where they  focus on  cooperation  and integration 
between  EU member states.  This is also evident  when  Nick  Clegg criticises the 
proposition  presented by  David Cameron  and Margaret  Thatcher  of a  flexible 
integration where EU member  states can  choose the laws and opt-outs they  find 
favourable,  since this will  create a  distrust  within  the EU and change the 
interdependence that  exist  in  the EU. Although  Clegg  himself propose that  UK 
should focus their  cooperation  in  the EU when  it  is favourable for  the UK, but  this 
idea  is more focused on  co-authorship within  the EU in  contrast  to Cameron and 
Thatcher  that  focus more on intergovernmental governance, but  still to benefit the 
UK. This logic  is also evident  when  in  the manifesto,  the Liberal  Democrats want  to 
implement the euro in  the UK to gain  more integration  and influence,  when  the time 
is right  for  the UK, which  imply  a more loose kind of integration that  they  have 
previously  presented. Clegg  further  argues in  his speech  that  leaving  the UK would be 
a loss of sovereignty, given that UK gain international influence by being in the EU.
LABOUR
“I  am pleased to say that my party is  united in the  view that 
Britain is stronger in the EU than it would be outside”  (Miliband, 
2012)
Even  though this inclusive statement  by  Ed Miliband,  leader  of the opposition  and 
head of the New  Labour  party, is currently  up for  discussion it  certainly  does hold 
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some historic  truth.  As we have seen, the Labour  party  have had strong  variations in 
their  position  towards the EU. Gaitskell  being  famous for  his exclusive Eurosceptic 
speech  in  which  accession  to the EEC was articulated as bringing the end of British 
history,  Wilson lodging  the second application to the EEC in  1967  to Labour 
opposition leader Michael Foot’s no-campaign to the ‘75  referendum  and the ‘83 
manifesto arguing  “British withdrawal from  the Community is  the right policy for 
Britain - to be completed well within the lifetime of this parliament” (Labour, 1983).
With  the leadership of Neil  Kinnock, Labour  moved to a much  more positive attitude 
to the EU with  the  ‘87  Manifesto stating: “Labour’s  aim is  to work  constructively 
with our EEC partners to  promote economic expansion and combat 
unemployment.”  (Labour,  1987). As Rosamond & Wincott put it: “the Labour party 
moved away from an anti-European position from  the mid-1980s and that more or 
less  simultaneously anti-European sentiment rose within the Conservative 
party” (Rosamond & Wincott, 2006: 8).  The antagonistic  constructions of a  (mostly) 
pro conservative party,  a  sceptic  Labour  and vice-versa  have numerous explanations, 
have been acted out in various ways and pertained to different logics of discourse.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS A REACTION TO GLOBALISATION
Tony  Blair’s New  Labour and his embrace of globalisation,  considering it as an 
external  economic and political  constraint 9,  also part of the New  Labour  to pursue 
the Third way,  rejecting both top down socialism  as well as traditional neo-
liberalism  (BBC,  1999), or what he in  2009  deemed “New  Capitalism”  (Blair, 2009). 
These ideas have now  become sedimented in  the discourse of the New  Labour party. 
As Miliband stated in 2012:
“there are  problems in the world today that are  simply too large, 
too international in scope  for any nation state  standing alone  to 
deal with. And to believe  otherwise is  just to hark back to a bygone 
age that is not coming back” (Miliband, 2012)
He thus, as Blair,  invokes globalisation as the  reason  for  European  Integration  and 
followingly  also dissolves,  much  like Macmillan, the opposition  between  national 
identity,  sovereignty  and European Integration. This approach  is also followed by  the 
rejection of WWII as the defining  nodal  point for  British  political identity  and 
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9 Below, we have collected a few quotes by Blair that illustrates how he invokes Globalisation as an external economic constraint forcing 
national governments to reform: “The forces of change are pervasive and fundamental; [...] they require nations to adapt and reform with 
equal rapidity” (Blair, 2000). “What is the answer to such a challenge? Not to retreat into the past or cling to the status quo, even if it 
cannot sensibly be justified; but to rediscover from first principles what it is that makes us British and to develop that identity in a way in 
tune with the modern world” (Blair, 2000a). In 2009 he describes Globalisation very explicitly as an external factor: “There is a myth that 
globalisation is the result of a policy driven by Governments; and can be altered or even reversed by Governments. It isn't. It is driven by 
people. Globalisation is not just an economic fact. It is about the internet, its power to communicate, influence and shape a world whose 
frontiers are coming down. It's about mass travel, migration, modern media. It is not simply an economic fact; it is in part an attitude of 
mind. It is where young people choose to be.” (Blair, 2009)
instead invokes a  much  more pragmatic  and to some extent  ideological argument  of 
social ethics.
“My argument is that it’s  not just the fading of that ideal [EU 
putting peace  and prosperity in place  of war and destruction] 
which has  led to British Euroscepticism. Nor can we  put 
Euroscepticism down to bendy bananas and bans on British 
chocolate. There  are  real failures. [...] twenty five  million people 
without jobs. [...] That can’t be  right. We need to argue  the case  in 
a new way [...] That case starts with our economy” (Ibid.)
Speaking  at the CBI conference, Miliband thusly  presents the economic issues as the 
raison d’être  for  UK’s membership of the EU without  constructing an  antagonism 
between  this agenda  and political integration; exemplifying the attempt  of 
reconciling  issues of economic rational interest with  national  political  and 
democratic interests. But  rather  than reconciling  these poles in  a  construction  that 
neglects issues of sovereignty,  and blindly  accept  impediments - an  instrumental and 
functional relation  is created, where both  issues of national economic  interest,  as 
well  as issues of the democracy/bureaucracy  dichotomy, can  be alleviated through 
participation in  European cooperation  on new  terms. Hereby,  Miliband reaffirms the 
logics of the discursive structure relating  to the quid pro  quo  conception  of UK-EU 
relations,  by  reaffirming an  antagonistic relation  to a discourse of democracy  as 
decentralisation  discerned in  the right side of figure 1.1  (exemplified by  the reference 
to ridiculing  discourses of distant and illogical bureaucratic legislations of “bendy 
bananas”  etc.; “Let’s not treat this as an argument of faith: let’s  argue the 
case” (Miliband,  2012)).  He thus, to some extent,  rejects the use of the symbols of 
sentiment,  (bendy  bananas,  etc.)  that are often  invoked by  mainstream  media  as well 
as Ukip in  particular  and instead seeks to bring forth  rational arguments about 
effectiveness and economic  benefits.  Believers in  the EU should instead invoke “a 
passionate defence of the institutions of the European Union” (Ibid.,  emphasis 
added)
EU AND UK: AN UNSETTLED QUESTION
Despite Miliband’s very  positive approach  to EU membership he does invoke some of 
the same arguments as the conservatives about the UK-EU relation  as strongly 
dislocated in need of reform/renegotiation:
“For around three decades, our membership of the  European 
Union has seemed to be  a settled question. But you will have 
noticed, it is not any more. [...] I believe  our future  demands we 
reform the European Union.” (Ibid.)
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This emphasis on reform  and unsettled nature of the relationship is also apparent  in 
his approach to the question of flexible integration:
“I  believe  we must work to ensure  that this more  flexible European 
Union, where  some  countries pursue  deeper integration and others 
don’t, still benefits all.” (Ibid.)
He thus, as Cameron,  seeks to accommodate the differences between  a  unitary 
political inclination  as well  as responsibilities  of national development and sound 
economic  and political  governance through  cooperative measures in a  “flexible” 
European Union (ibid.).
EU AS A MEANS FOR THE ONE NATION ECONOMY
The most  prominent  construction  of antagonisms in  Miliband’s articulations relate to 
the portrait of inward looking Britons as unambitious opposite  to which  New  Labour 
party  stands: “An ambitious Britain have always  been an outward looking Britain - 
an inward looking Britain can never be an ambitious  Britain”  (Ibid.).  Following  the 
same lines,  Miliband’s idea of the One Nation  economy, also shares this global 
outlook,  despite  its solitary  connotations: “The reality of our multiple identities.  One 
Nation doesn’t mean one identity.” (Miliband, 2012a). He does, however, build up a 
certain hierarchy  in  the relationship between  EU and UK.  In  his One Nation in 
Europe  speech  Miliband discusses the unsettled nature of UK’s relationship with  EU. 
He argues that he “would not let Britain sleepwalk  toward exit from  the [EU]” after 
which  he lists the reasons and builds up the hierarchy: because it  “would threaten 
our national prosperity.  [...]  would make it far harder to build the One Nation 
Economy that I believe in.  [...] would be a betrayal of our  national 
interest”  (Miliband, 2012).  Such  articulations thus construct a  hierarchy  in  which  the 
EU necessarily  becomes a  means for achieving  the national goal (One Nation 
economy),  distancing Labour from  e.g.  the Liberal Democrats’ approach.  He thus 
invokes EU membership as “a desirable  yet contingent outcome” (Rosamond & Hay, 
2002: 12) in  the sense that  EU membership becomes dependent  on  its ability  to 
deliver  results and fulfil the national goals.  Such  an  articulation  also invokes the need 
for  reform, as mentioned above,  and establishes the UK-EU relationship as a 
dislocated issue.  Rosamond & Hay  makes somewhat  of the same argument with 
regards to Blair’s articulations of Globalisation.  They  argue that  he combines “two 
starkly opposed discourses”10,  of Globalisation  as either  an  external economic 
constraint as well as Globalisation as a desirable yet contingent outcome. 
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10 Rosamond & Hay (2002: 12) make this point with regards to Blair’s conception of the UK’s relationship with EU but we 
would argue that the same argument is still valid as Miliband’s articulation follow much of the same logics. 
Being contingent  it does thus not undermine the British  nation  state but,  is instead 
pursued by  the government  as a  desirable outcome, leaving room  for  opt-outs and 
national self-determination. Rosamond & Hay  discusses this as evidence of a  highly 
strategic  approach,  whilst we argue that  it  can  also be understood as an  attempt of 
political re-articulation  within  a  dislocated field that  is often  divided into strongly 
opposing  we/they  categories. The discursive struggles should thus not  be considered 
as a  hoax, double game as Moravcsik might label  it nor  a  rhetorical cover-up of real 
intentions (as in  Hooghe & Marks’ concepts of cueing and priming by  elites for 
creating  consent) but  rather  as a  political attempt  to re-articulate, challenge and 
construct  a  system  of meaning that  mediate between  two otherwise antagonistic 
discursive systems by  engaging in  the hegemonic struggle for  sedimenting  the 
dislocated elements in  British  politics such as immigration  policy, economic  policy, 
etc.
UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP)
“The  genie  is out of the  bottle: the fight for our country's liberty 
starts today and we are more relevant than ever.” (Farage 2013a)
Ukip has received much  attention in  recent months,  not  only  for  their  harsh 
eurosceptic rhetoric,  but  also recently  for  their  success in  the May  2013  county 
elections in  the UK, and their  increasingly  important  role in  the 2015  general  election 
in  the UK, where they  stand to increase their  political influence significantly. 
Traditionally  a  party  with  its main (and to a  certain  degree only) aim  of British 
withdrawal  from  the EU, Ukip is in  the process of developing  a  comprehensive 
national policy  program  and manifesto for  the upcoming national elections, with 
British  unitary  national  development and political  decentralisation  as the main 
foundation  for  its policies (Ukip 2013a).  By  constant  reference to the aim  of 
‘restoring’ democracy  and attempts of ‘clawing  back’ from  the hold of the 
bureaucratic (read undemocratic) constraints of the EU Ukip constantly  articulates a 
notion of unitarity  and de-centralisation  of political  institutions, as a  result  of their 
sharply  antagonistic and condensed interpretation of British  political  identities in  the 
inner levels of the discourse.
As such  Ukip’s articulation of both  conceptions of a  British  political identity  as well 
as the presentation  of the EU is narrowly  present  in  the they compartment  of fig.  1.1 
and the party  has strong objections towards any  political  attempt of converging  in 
any  ‘hybrid’ of EU membership.  Ukip’s strong  objection  towards any  membership of 
the EU is based on a  strict interpretation of the political identity  of UK, and as such 
resembles the Conservative party’s equivalence of de-centralisation as a  key  nodal 
point  for  democracy, and bureaucratic  EU as an  impediment  to British  democracy. 
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However,  Ukip introduces a  clearer binary  opposition  between the EU and the UK, 
leading  to rejection  of any  ‘real’ possibility  of influence within  the Union: “They 
might let us catch herrings in the Solent but not much more.” (Farage 2013a).
This binary  construction  is enabled by  a  clear  rejection  of any  arguments of economic 
rationalisation  through  integration, but  rather an  introduction  of counter  arguments 
whose logic resembles that of Ukip’s unitary  argument  is presented,  by  referring to 
concrete, cash in hand benefits of leaving  the EU,  such  as saving  £43  mill. a  day. 
Furthermore,  a re-introduction  of Commonwealth  cooperation  in  economic  areas is 
sought  in  order  to reestablish  the position of the UK as a global political power, as 
well  as retaining  a  sound economic future without  any  risk  of impeding unitary 
development and political sovereignty,  both  by  focusing  on economic ties, as well  as 
acknowledging  the cultural and political  compatibility  between the Commonwealth 
countries:
“UKIP will seek to establish a Commonwealth Free Trade  Area 
(CFTA) with the  53 other Commonwealth countries. … 
Commonwealth nations  share  a common language, legal and 
democratic systems, account for a third of the  world’s  population 
and a quarter of its  trade, with the  average  age  of a citizen just 25 
years. India, for example, will soon become  the  second largest 
world economy and Britain should not be tied to the dead political 
weight of the European Union, but retain its  own friendly trading 
and cultural links “ (Ukip 2010)
Concludingly, we see a  clear  line from  the unitary  conception  of British identity  and 
the articulations made by  Ukip regarding  the EU.  EU is constructed as an 
antagonistic and exogenous constraint  and as undermining UK development and 
democracy,  both  economically  and culturally  (by  their  strong  articulations that 
establishes a chain of equivalence between  British  culture and political institutions). 
Ukip’s construction of foreign  British  policy  is highly  (only)  articulated through 
connotations to an  orthodox  interpretation of British  political identity, leading  to an 
antagonising  and even adversarial conception  of the continental EU as putting  ‘two 
fingers up’ at  UK preferences (Farage 2013b).  Furthermore we discern a strong 
primacy  of culture (political and social) in  matters of integration, as can  be discerned 
from the above quote.
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MAPPING OUT CURRENT POLITICAL ARTICULATIONS
Fig. 1.2 Discursive Structures of British EU-debate, incl. contem
porary party conceptions
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STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE DEBATE
Through  the above analysis we have discerned two structural changes to our  figure 
of discursive systems: a  dissolution  of the border  between the two conceptions of EU 
on  the far left  of the figure and a  change in  the role of the historical importance of the 
post-war  reconciliation  discourse on  European  Integration. What we have spoken of 
as a  logic co-constituting an  understanding of the British  history  in Europe as 
exceptional,  is no longer  structured by  the UK’s role in  WWII,  as a  defining nodal 
point,  but  increasingly  incorporates other  interpretations/narratives of the  British 
history  in  Europe as exceptional.  Ukip still  invokes the narrative of the special role in 
WWII whilst  Conservatives,  New  Labour  and the Liberal Democrats regard the War 
as an  outdated reason  for  European Integration  and followingly  invoke arguments of 
an  economic  and ‘rational’ nature.  Thus, the traditional  conception  of the EU as a 
continental European  project and WWII as a  defining  nodal  point is sustained only 
in  the orthodox unitary  interpretation  of British  political  identity  as illustrated in  the 
right part of the figure.
VERTICAL MOVEMENT OF POLITICAL ARTICULATIONS
We have illustrated how  the different  political  parties construct  their  arguments 
using  different logical  constructions, giving  meaning  to and structuring their 
conceptions of EU-UK relations as well as visions or  conceptions of the 
contemporary  EU. We have done this by  drawing  out  the parties’ constructions with 
the use of coloured arrows. Ukip construct their  conception  of the EU by  creating 
chains of equivalence between the EU and an un-democratic  bureaucracy, 
incompatible with  national particularities (identity  questions) nor  national political 
institutions that  on  the other  hand are considered the only  legitimate authority. 
Arguments concerning  decentralisation, unitary  sovereignty  and innate  differences 
between  Britons and Europeans are invoked in  order  to legitimise their  approach. 
The use of symbolic  gestures,  such  as ‘bendy  bananas’,  ‘bans on  olive oil’ and 
adversarial  notions of the EU as ‘putting  two fingers up’ at  Britain,  underline the 
structural  constraints of their  unitary  political identity  and reaffirm  the necessary 
construction of EU as the antagonistic other.
Mapping the Extremes
The Liberal Democrats, lead by  Nick  Clegg, are strongly  opposed to the conception’s 
of Ukip and, as with  Ukip, they  partly  construct  their  arguments with  the use of 
antagonistic oppositions to their  respective standpoints. The Liberal Democrats 
argue that  the idea  of unitary  sovereignty, and thus a loss of such  due to membership 
of the EU, will quite oppositely  result  in  a  “catastrophic  loss  of sovereignty” (Clegg, 
2012) as sovereignty  is sustained only  through network governance and co-operation 
with  other  states. This approach is legitimised with  the use of rational economic 
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arguments,  arguments about  global  power structures constraining unitary  relations 
between  states and followingly  portrays withdrawal as undemocratic; membership 
equals influence/democracy. Both  Ukip and the Liberal Democrats have thus 
constructed relatively  stable narratives due to their  articulations of chains of 
equivalence in  direct opposition  to each  other,  thereby  recursively  reaffirming  the 
identities’ external and internal  integrity  through  constant  articulations of sharply 
antagonistic symbols and logics.
A Converged Discourse
As mentioned, Labour  and Conservatives have, in  general,  historically  constructed 
their  narratives in opposition  to each  other; when  Labour was sceptic  Conservatives 
were positive and the other  way  around (Rosamond & Wincott, 2006: 8). The 
contemporary  picture,  however,  becomes much  different  and intriguing  when  we 
look at their  discursive movements and logical constructions. We identify,  from  both 
parties,  discursive articulations mediating between  the binary  opposition  as 
described above between Ukip and the Liberal  Democrats. This convergence is seen 
graphically  in  figure 1.2  as the movements of red and blue arrows,  first  towards the 
outer conceptions of British  political  identity  (middle level), and then  their 
convergence in  the centred conception  of EU (upper  level).  There is,  however, still  a 
significant difference the two parties in between.  The discursive articulations by 
Cameron  navigate between  a  strong  focus on  decentralisation  of national politics, a 
somewhat  unitary  perception  of sovereignty  and a pro-European approach  focusing 
on  economic  rationalities, focused on  the single market  and deregulation  policies. 
Cameron,  on  this issue, it  could be argued, mediates between these conceptions as a 
strategic  attempt to construct a  narrative that  can  entail  conceptions of the whole 
party  that  are increasingly  divided on  the issue with  the conservative backbenchers 
pushing for a move towards the logics illustrated in the upper left corner.
Labour  on  the other  hand are in  a  much  more sedimented situation where they  have 
succeeded in  constructing  a  narrative much  like the logic of the Liberal Democrats, 
despite huge functional-political differences, in  which  national particularities are 
sustained through  EU membership as external  constraints force governments to 
reform  and adapt  to this inevitable  development  commonly  symbolised by  Blair’s 
New  Labour.  We would argue,  however, that  their  contemporary  approach  is better 
understood in  the same box  as the Conservatives as their  combination  of different 
logics seems to be more decisive in  shaping  their  political articulations and the 
ambivalence they  entail. This is seen  in  Miliband’s stern commitment  to EU 
membership whilst  he also invokes the need for  reforming  Europe to fit  with  his One 
Nation  economy. This is followed by  the construction  of a  hierarchy  in  which 
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European  involvement is considered as a  means for  achieving  the One Nation 
economy.  This approach  thus requires the need for  establishing  some sort  of 
unsettled relationship with  the EU in  which  reform  and flexibility  are key 
requirements. Labour’s conception  of UK’s relationship with  EU in  turn becomes an 
unresolved question  arguing,  in  the same terms as Cameron,  for  both wider  and 
looser  integration,  need for  reform  and the understanding that  the EU is first and 
foremost instrumental for British development.
What  we identify  is an  attempt  to mediate between  two opposite conceptions, 
historically  constructed as antagonistic, and hereby  create an ‘agonistic’ political 
space,  that  seeks to de-politicise the empty  signifiers and nodal points upon  which 
they  are based through  the dissolution of antagonistic relations. This attempt of 
hegemonising a  discourse of convergence is based on attempts of merging two 
discursive systems, and thus their inherent chains of equivalence must  also be sought 
to be dissolved and re-articulated as one. This can  be discerned in  Miliband’s and 
Blair’s rejection  of traditional  arguments of ‘sentiment’ and a  diversion  towards more 
rationalist  arguments.  Conservative articulations from  Cameron  entails a similar 
logic  of quid pro  quo measures, but logics sustaining the traditional Conservative 
political identity, by  projecting  unitary  political  institutions on  to the EU. But  where 
Conservative and Labour  discourses differ  is in the success  of their  sedimentation; 
the Labour  party  line,  as argued above,  is a  construction of EU as instrumental  for 
national development  where UK can exert  its influence on  national  matters; the 
Conservative line on  the other  hand,  although  relying  on  the same discourse of 
flexibility,  argues for  re-negotiation  of EU as a foundation  for  this instrumental 
relationship’s success.
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STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FRAMING
Returning  to Hooghe & Marks’ conception of political  elites’  cueing of individuals, 
into believing that  certain  factors of identity  incapacitates a  certain political 
possibility; thus implying  that  political elites frame certain issues as pertaining  to 
questions of identity  in  order to fulfill own political goals,  and eventually 
compromising  their  own agenda.  What  we show  in  our  analysis,  grounded in  a 
thorough empirical analysis of discursive systems within  the British  EU debate, is 
rather  that  political elites are constrained by  the logical constructions of their 
argumentation. Thus,  we challenge the conception  of political actors as being  able to 
pick  and choose national identities as it  suits them  when  framing certain issues in 
order to achieve political victories.
We do not  disagree with  the point  that  right-wing  populist  parties, such  as the Ukip, 
often  invoke a  strong  connection  to ‘love of country  and its institutions’, but  we argue 
that  these articulations are highly  contingent  and structured by  the party’s 
conception  of British  political identity,  and are not  just a  product of elitist strategy, 
incorporating  static conceptions of national identity.  When  the Conservatives argue 
for  both  maintenance of unitary  parliamentary  sovereignty  in  combination  with  a 
pro-European  approach, logically  conflicting with  each  other,  it should thus neither 
be understood as framing  or  cueing  but is better captured as a  product of their 
historically  constructed narrative. This narrative is build up by  adhering to different 
logics,  nodal points and ideas and thus constrain  the possible political  articulations. 
Cueing and framing stands in  sharp contrast  to this perception  as they  fail to 
acknowledge the importance of such  historical constraints in  arguing that cueing and 
framing can be acted out in  opposition to the true,  real or  innate interests and 
values of a  political  actor. What we illustrate through  our  analysis, pointed out  in 
figure 1.1  and 1.2, is the highly  contingent nature of identity; presenting  a  highly 
content-dependent  analysis of a  multitude of contingent  discursive systems that 
enable and constrain  debate in  opposition  to quantitative analyses of identity 
implications necessarily implying a static conception of identity.
DISCUSSING POSSIBLE POLITICAL TRAJECTORIES
As in  any  theory  trying  to explain  ‘how’ a  present situation has come about,  and 
specifically  in  a post-structuralist  account  of identity  creation  as complex as in  the 
situation  of Britain,  the question of predicting  future developments seems even 
foolhardy  at  some point.  Nevertheless, we will  venture so far as to explain how  the 
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discursive developments in  a  converged11  discourse of British  EU membership 
constitute some possible  political trajectories. By  epistemological  design,  any  change 
in  the discursive system  is ultimately  possible,  but in  stable discursive systems some 
changes are simply  unlikely  under  present  structures. By  combining  the layered 
structures of the discursive systems and taking into account  it’s inherent  chains of 
equivalence and antagonistic  boundaries we can begin to conceive of a  limited array 
of possibilities (Wæver 2005).
Cameron’s speech, opening for  a  possible referendum  can be envisaged as an 
acceptance of the undecided nature of the converged political conception  of 
instrumentalism and unitary democratic concerns,  seeking to establish  a  ‘peaceful’ 
space in  which  two otherwise opposing  logics co-exist,  by  dissolving  antagonistic 
boundaries.  But consensus will  always entail  hegemonisation; converging 
antagonistic political identities entail  a dislocation  of the structuration  of nodal 
points and invokes a  critical  need for  re-articulation in  order  to re-establish  a  new 
symbolic/logical order  that inscribes meaning to the political project.  Because the 
present  situation  in  Britain  is characterised by  its discursive instability,  the possible 
predictions will  also have to relate to ‘inner’ structures,  and as such  pertain  to 
broader  issues with  deeper structural effects. In  the case of the Conservative 
articulations of British  membership to the EU, the establishment of a  new  symbolic 
order have three logically established possible trajectories.
First,  the hegemonisation  of a  quid pro quo  logic, where issues of unitary  sovereignty 
must  take a  second place  to an  economic and political rationalisation logic  will 
establish  unity  between  Labour  and Conservative party  lines.  Hereby  different 
identifications with  these deeper  logics (middle level)  will have an  effect  on  outcomes 
for  the Conservative party,  because it  introduces a  construction  of the EU which  is 
irreconcilable with  the one of Ukip,  and some Conservative backbenchers sharing 
this political identity.
Second, the opposite scenario where unitary  political  identity  takes a  central  point 
and quid pro  quo issues must  give way  for  the necessity  of opt-outs and re-
negotiation, will  be established through  a  hegemonisation of unitary  political identity 
within  the party. Following  this particular  logic, where issues of decentralisation  and 
unitariness defines democratic legitimacy,  any  possibility  of UK membership seems 
highly  unlikely,  in  a  future situation where demands for  opt-outs and renegotiation 
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11 Converged in the sense that we have discerned Conservative movement in the figure, in two separate ways, but with 
convergence on a single political issue: Both a move through the quid pro quo political identity, as well as through the unitary 
political identity. This convergence illustrates the intra-party differences as well as the discursive attempt to dissolve binary 
oppositions between the two deeper levels.
are not  fulfilled.  Congruently,  Conservative arguments of EU membership must 
create a  viable prospect  for re-negotiated membership that harmoniously  relate to 
the deeper logics of the unitary political identity.
Last,  as in  any  dislocated field of discursive elements,  is present  the possibility  of re-
articulation  of discursive elements by  the construction  of new  nodal  points and 
empty  signifiers, instilling  meaning  in  the discursive structures. As we have laid out, 
the identity  crisis  within  discourses on British  EU membership pertains to inner 
logics,  and deeper  structures of discourse,  that are challenged by  new  articulations 
and thus,  the possibility  of a  conflict  and crisis within  these inner  logics is 
established.  Thus,  a  new  re-articulation of these political identities seeking  to 
establish  a  convergent  discourse, must  establish  new  chains of equivalence between 
privileged elements that both  establishes stable and peaceful/agonistic relations 
between  its elements,  as well as defines new  antagonistic  boundaries. This is what  we 
have seen Labour  do with  Blair  as leader  in  the Third Way and currently  in 
Miliband’s conception  of the One Nation project.  Thus, the hegemonic  struggle for 
defining  British  membership is far  from  over, but  are contingent  on  the political 
actors’  attempt of suturing  the void established by  seeking  to converge otherwise 
historically constructed antagonistic discourses.
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CONCLUSION
“How  is  the relationship between the UK and the  EU articulated 
historically by the main political parties of the UK and what are the 
implications of such articulations  for the present debate on the 
possibility of an in/out referendum?”
Answering the above question  we have constructed our  analytical framework  as 
divided into two steps - synchronic and diachronic - and thus combine a  historical 
reading with  a  contemporary  political  analysis. This have been done with  the use of 
discourse analysis as our  primary  analytical tool  whilst  also considering  other 
epistemological  approaches to the subject.  This entails understanding  identities as 
socially  constructed through co-constitutive understandings to which  we gain  access 
by  a  primary  reading of text  in  which  political articulations reveal the constructions 
of binary oppositions, historical nodal points and chains of equivalence.
Through  our  analysis we make the argument  that  political  identities can  not  be 
considered as static  due to their  historical contingency  and constitutive lack; leaving 
them  in  a situation  in  which they  position  themselves in  relation  to others by 
fulfilling  this lack  by  references to antagonistic ‘Others’,  nodal points and other 
systems of meaning. Doing  this they  followingly  abide to the logical and historically 
contingent constructions of such which leaves them  in  both  discursively  constraining 
as well as enabling situations. We argue that  statistical  analyses are not able to offer 
insights into how  such  structures function in  relation  to political identities and 
logically  they  have to invoke ideas of political identities as having  some essentialist 
core to which  they  can  be true or  betray. Such  analytical  constructions can be seen in 
Hooghe & Marks conception  of how  political  parties frame  or  cue  political messages 
as some sort  of betrayal of their  real interests or  values.  In  our  analysis we find that 
such  a  conception  can be challenged by  looking at  the historical contingency  of 
modern political articulations and that  statistical analyses will have to be 
supplemented by such analyses in order to understand changes in actor preferences.
In  figure 1.1  and 1.2  we have illustrated the findings from  our  analyses of how 
articulations by  leading British political  actors have followed as well as constructed 
logics and structures of discourse which constrain  and enable the possibilities of 
what  they  can  legitimately  articulate on  behalf of their  symbolic  affiliation,  either  a 
Conservative,  Labour,  Ukip or  Liberal Democrat politician.  Our  analysis shows that 
the current  debate can  beneficially  be understood in terms of a  discursive crisis in 
which  Ukip and Liberal Democrats construct  stabile narratives as their  use of 
historical logics are sedimented in  clear  binary  oppositions and hierarchies.  Labour 
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and Conservatives on  the other  hand seek  to construct  a  political identity  in  which 
they  combine logics that  have historically  been constructed as oppositions to each 
other and thus demand that some relations remain unstable and open  for 
(re-)negotiation  as the identity  is not  constructed through clear  binary  oppositions 
but instead seeks to re-articulate the relations between  elements such  as unitary 
sovereignty  and a  regional co-operation. Labour  are largely  successful in  sedimenting 
such  oppositional logics,  especially  during  Blair’s leadership and his articulations of 
the Third Way but also to a  large extent  in Milibands One Nation project.  As much 
as they  are successful in  sedimenting  their  position  it  remains clear  that their 
position  is still  not stable in  the same sense as Ukip and Liberal Democrat’s are, and 
thus they  have to incorporate an  element  of uncertainty  and need for reform.  It  also 
comes to show  in  their  use of argumentation  in  binary  oppositions,  in  which  they 
often  rely  on being in  opposition  to the Conservative party  which, as we have shown, 
construct  their  argumentation through  much of the same logics as Labour, and the 
position of Labour thus becomes blurred and in lack of clear visions12.
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12 Jon Worth a prominent blogger on British EU affairs, nominated by the leading EU news website Euractiv as one of the 40 
most influential Britons on EU policy, recently pointed out how Labour’s EU policy has very little vision; “[with regards to a 5 
point list of Labour’s EU vision] Inspiring, eh? Who says Labour doesn’t have a vision for the EU? [NOTE: this is not what 
Labour should say. It's more of a critique of how little vision the party has right now.” (Worth, 2013). 
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